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Abstract: Contemporary accounts of corporate legal evolution view lawmakers as highly 
responsive to the economic interests of both pressure groups and markets. Through this lens 
law is understood to be the product of pressures exerted by managers, investors, institutional 
shareholders and the Federal Government, and the incentives of state lawmakers to 
accommodate the interests of these pressure groups. This lens dominates our current 
understanding of corporate legal evolution in the United States and is becoming highly 
influential in comparative accounts of corporate legal variation. This article sounds a note of 
objection. The article argues that the disciplinary pendulum has swung too far toward external 
accounts of legal evolution and too far away from internal accounts of legal change which view 
the path of law, at least in part, as the product of the internally generated constraints of the 
legal system – the relative autonomy of the law. To make this argument, the article considers 
the internal constraint of the conception of the corporation in 19th century US and UK 
corporate law and the evolution of self-dealing law in these two jurisdictions. It shows how 
two jurisdictions that started from the same legal proposition about self-dealing diverged 
rapidly as a result of the interaction of this proposition with profoundly different conceptions 
of the corporation. Contrary to the dominant account of the evolution of self-dealing law in 
the United States, the contemporary self-dealing rule is not the legally unexplained product of 
external market pressures but the logical and consistent product of the path of fiduciary law 
trodden through the corporate conception. The article shows that for contemporary corporate 
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A discipline’s theory of legal change and evolution provides its presumptive 
vantage point for understanding and assessing contemporary rules. For example, if 
the underlying theory of legal change understands law as an adaption to the needs 
of its constituency of users, then the scholar will seek to account for how the law 
satisfies those needs, and the regulator or legislator will be wary of intervention. 
But if the theory of change identifies extraneous bias and distortion in the process 
of law making, then the vantage point of both scholar and law-maker will be 
critical of law’s failure to fulfil its function and more reform orientated.  A 
discipline’s theory of historical change is therefore central to its assessment of the 
legitimacy and efficacy of existing rules and central to what the discipline does: 
what it views as the role of scholarship; and what it views as legitimate approaches 
to that scholarship.       
Understanding the drivers of legal evolution is at the heart of contemporary 
corporate law scholarship. Over the past half century scholars have provided 
innovative and compelling accounts of why corporate law looks as it does today.  
These accounts share a theory of legal change which, in different guises, views 
legal change as the product of pressure exerted by the economic and financial 
needs and interests of the market place and its constituent players. It is an 
approach that has a close affinity with Marxist historiography which views 
superstructure as the direct product of ‘material behaviour’.1   
This article argues that this dominant theory of legal change is partial and 
therefore inaccurate. It treats subsidiary drivers as primary drivers and pays scant 
regard to the primary driver. Following Holmes, American scholars have long 
been warned against treating the life of law as logic.2 But in embracing Holmes’ 
call for engagement with economics and statistics,3 the fact that a legal system may 
have certain logics that have a substantial impact on the path of legal change has 
been increasingly ignored by corporate scholarship.  Today the ‘legal’ in 
mainstream ‘corporate legal history’ is disappearing. Without it, accounts of legal 
change are inaccurate, and the contemporary scholarly vantage point finds itself in 
the wrong place.    
There are several layers of this economic understanding of historical change. 
The first and most readily accessible is the idea that lawmakers are responsive to 
instrumental economic imperatives. In this account law will adapt to ensure that it 
is responsive to the needs and interests of commerce, although in doing so it may 
                                                     
1 In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels observe that: ‘[C]conceiving, thinking, and the intellectual 
relationships of men appear here as the direct result of their material behaviour. The same applies to 
intellectual production as manifested in a people’s language of politics, law, morality, religion, 
metaphysics, etc’. L.H. Simon, Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing, 1994). 
2 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1881), 1.  
3 O.W. Holmes, ‘The Path of Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457. 
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mistake the interests of individuals, such as managers, for the interests of 
commerce.4 A second, and dominant, economic account of corporate legal change 
for the past 40 years pivots around the horizontal state versus state competition 
for corporate charters,5 and the vertical pressures placed on state corporate law 
making as a result of the threat of Federal pre-emption of corporate law.6 Through 
these lenses law is the product of the economic incentives and pressures exerted 
by the players in the corporate chartering process – the state and its coffers, the 
Federal Government, the founders, the managers, the shareholders, the capital 
markets and the plaintiff’s bar. Race to the bottom theorists view the managerial 
friendly nature of Delaware law as the product of the Delaware State’s 
responsiveness to the interests of managers who control the re-incorporation 
decision. Race to the top theorists view corporate law as responsive to the 
economic imperative of maximising the value of the corporation’s shares. Scholars 
that take a more nuanced view of the debate, such as Professor Bebchuk, argue 
that charter competition will generate pro-managerial rules in areas of corporate 
law, such as self-dealing and corporate opportunities, that are significantly re-
distributive to managers, and pro-shareholder rules which maximise value where 
they are not. 7 Other accounts of legal change and variation operate outside of the 
charter competition debate, but they do so with the same underlying 
understanding of legal change as the product of economic forces and pressures 
exerted by interest groups.8 For example, in recent important work Professors 
Armour and Skeel have argued that the divergence in the nature of takeover 
defence regulation in the US and the UK is the product of variation in the 
structure of corporate ownership in these countries, particularly the stronger 
presence of institutional investors in the UK in the late 1960s, who lobbied 
                                                     
4 See, generally, M.J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (Cambridge: CUP, 1977) and 
The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: OUP, 1992). 
5 See W. Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware’ (1974) 83 Yale Law Journal 
663; D.R. Fischel, ‘The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in 
Delaware’s Corporation Law’ (1982) 76 Northwestern University Law Review 913; J.R. Macey and G.P. Miller, 
‘Toward and Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law’ (1987) 65 Texas Law Review 469 (1987); 
L.A. Bebchuk, ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits of State Competition in Corporate 
Law’ (1992) 105(7) Harvard Law Review 1443; L.A. Bebchuk, A. Cohen, and A. Ferrell, ‘Does the Evidence 
Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1775; M.J. Roe, ‘Delaware’s 
Shrinking Half-Life’ (2009) 62 Stanford Law Review 125. 
6 See M.J. Roe, ‘Delaware’s Competition’ (2003) 117 Harvard Law Review 588 and ‘Delaware’s Politics’ 
(2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 2491. 
7 See W.W. Bratton, ‘Delaware Law as Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and the Basic Course 
After Twenty-Five Years’ (2000) 34 Georgia Law Review 447, 450-451, describing this position as the 
‘middle ground view of charter competition’; ‘states pursued suboptimal policies of management 
accommodation respecting fiduciary rules and anti-takeover legislation’. 
8 L.A. Bebchuk and M.J. Roe observe, for example, that ‘[i]nterest groups differ in their ability to mobilize 
and then exert pressure in favor of legal rules that favor them or against rules that disfavor them. The 
more resources and power a group has, the more influence the group will tend to have in the political 
process […] the existing corporate ownership structures will affect the resources (and hence political 
influence) that various players will have and thus the rules that will be chosen’. ‘A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 127, 157. 
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forcefully to protect their economic interests.9 They argue further that the 
common law rules in both jurisdictions are similar as a result of repeat player 
litigation which pressurizes courts to take account of managerial interests.10 
Through this lens of legal change the system of law becomes a black box in 
relation to which economic pressures are exerted to produce a legal product that 
comes out of the box. Through this lens, law as a relatively autonomous system 
does not play a role that could distort pressures, block some pressures, and 
facilitate others. Rather law, within the black box, simply becomes a mechanism of 
mediating multiple pressures and interests. Corporate law becomes a blank sheet 
of paper, and it is the economic fight over who gets to hold and control the pencil 
that determines the legal outcome.    
Central to these accounts of legal change are certain disciplinary narratives 
that serve as examples or standard bearers of legal change as the outcome of 
economic pressures and incentives. An account of legal change based on 
economic incentives and pressures must of course provide examples of legal 
change that are clearly explained in such terms. US corporate law provides such 
examples although, perhaps surprisingly given the dominance of this economic 
understanding of legal change, not many of them. Most important in this regard is 
the general narrative of the decline of the disciplinary power of fiduciary duties,11 
and the more specific example of the evolution of the self-dealing standard from a 
strict standard, that rendered voidable any self-dealing transaction regardless of 
fairness, to a standard that required only fairness. Other important narratives 
involve the evolution of takeover defences, including both the adoption of state 
takeover statutes and the failure to provide Unocal proportionality review with any 
teeth.12    
This article takes issue with this dominant economic understanding of legal 
change by challenging the widely accepted narrative about the evolution of US 
self-dealing law, and the related claim about the decline of American fiduciary 
standards. It does so through a close tracing of the evolution of self-dealing law in 
both the United Kingdom and the United States. UK and US self-dealing law 
begun by borrowing the same fiduciary principles from English trusts law to fill 
the gaps in their silent corporate codes, and for a brief period had the same UK 
case as the leading case. However, their laws rapidly diverged to provide starkly 
different fiduciary standards for directors. The mid-19th century common law rule 
in the UK was that a self-dealing transaction was voidable by the company in the 
                                                     
9 J. Armour and D.A. Skeel, Jr, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers and Why? The Peculiar 
Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 1727. 
10 See, further, H. Halbhuber and D. Kershaw, The Power of Ideas in Corporate Law: Evidence from Takeovers 
(on file with the authors 2011), taking issue with this interpretation of US and UK takeover law.  
11 For example, L.A. Cunningham, ‘Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance 
Alternative to Auditor Liability’ (2004) 52 UCLA Law Review 413, observing that the fiduciary ‘sealant 
decayed during the twentieth century’. 
12 For an application of the framework of analysis adopted in this article to takeover law, see Halbhuber 
and Kershaw, n 10 above. 
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absence of ex-ante authorisation or ex-post ratification.13 The leading case, Aberdeen 
Railway v Blaikie,14 observed that ‘so strictly is this principle adhered to that no 
question is allowed to be raised as to the fairness or unfairness of a contract so 
entered into’. In the United States, in key States such as New Jersey of New York, 
the rule in the mid-to-late 19th century appeared to be identical. Indeed, the 
leading US cases of this period invariably relied upon, and often extensively 
quoted from Aberdeen Railway.  Harold Marsh described the 1880s position in 
similar terms:  
 
In 1880 it could have been stated with confidence that in the United States 
the general rule was that any contract between a director and his corporation 
was voidable at the instance of the corporation or its shareholders, without 
regard to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction.15 
 
Explaining the evolution of self-dealing law in the United States has long been 
viewed as a puzzle for US corporate scholars.16 In his 1966 article, Are Directors 
Trustees, Marsh describes the evolution of US self-dealing law in three stages. In 
1880 the rule was as stated above; by 1910 the strict voidability rule had been 
replaced with a rule that allowed directors to enter into transactions with the 
corporation provided the transaction was fair and had been approved by a 
disinterested majority of directors; and by 1960 all that was required for a 
legitimate self-dealing transaction was that the transaction was fair. Marsh 
famously decried this shift away from the voidability rule. He accused the courts 
who presided over this shift as being ‘shamefaced’ and noted the courts’ wholesale 
failure to articulate the reasons for abandoning the voidability rule. By way of 
contrast, in 1880, 1910, 1960 and 1980 the position in the UK was unaltered from 
the strict voidability rule articulated in Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie in 1854.  
How do we explain the apparent evolutionary dynamism of US corporate law 
and the evolutionary stasis of UK corporate law? Naturally, when legal starting 
points – the absence of regulation in either UK or US corporate codes, the shared 
sources of English fiduciary law from which corporate law in the US and UK 
borrowed, and the apparent identical initial interpretation of such borrowed legal 
goods – are the same, we look outside of the law and not within it to explain 
divergent paths. The widely held understanding of US self-dealing law, even 
without the comparativist’s gaze, has been to understand its evolution as an 
example of law’s responsiveness to economic forces and interest group pressure. 
Scholars have suggested that courts were captured by managerial interest group 
pressure or that courts became increasingly aware of the need for law to adjust to 
                                                     
13 See J. Edelman, ‘The Fiduciary Self-Dealing Rule’ in J. Glister and P. Ridge (eds), Fault Lines in Equity 
(Hart Publishing: Oxford, forthcoming in 2011) arguing that self-dealing transactions are void.  
14 (1854) Macq Hl 461.  
15 H. Marsh, ‘Are Directors Trustees: Conflicts of Interest and Morality’ (1966) 22 Business Law 35. 
16 R. Clark, Corporate Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1986), 160, referring to the evolution of self-dealing law 
as a ‘historical puzzle’. 
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the instrumental economic needs of the market place: self-dealing transactions can 
provide significant benefits to companies, especially in small companies.17  
Furthermore, this account of the evolution of self-dealing law is a perfect fit with 
US corporate law’s primary contemporary narrative about the external drivers of 
legal change, namely the effects of state competition for corporate charters.  
The juxtaposition of UK self-dealing law next to US self-dealing law 
ostensibly affirms this view of the drivers of the evolution of self-dealing law in 
the United States.  It is often claimed that US judges adopt, and have long 
adopted, a more consequentialist style of legal reasoning which is necessarily more 
open to influence from the real economic world.18 If one were to place any 
contemporary UK corporate case next to its Delaware counterpart a reader would 
be immediately struck by the absence of consequentialist reasoning in the UK 
judgments and the absence of policy discussion as an acknowledged driver of legal 
outcomes. By contrast, the Delaware courts pride themselves on their 
connectedness to the needs and vocabulary of the market place and the 
understanding of the policy rationales that underpin legal rules.19 One might 
conclude therefore that the different paths of UK and US self-dealing law are 
explained by a much greater receptivity on the part of US courts, as compared to 
their UK counterparts, to the instrumental economic needs of the market place. 
Furthermore, the UK is not, and has never been, a jurisdiction that is subject to 
charter competition in any meaningful respect.20 Accordingly, the different UK 
and US trajectories of self-dealing law fit well with a narrative that explains US 
legal evolution through the lens of the pro-managerial pressures on law-making in 
significantly redistributive areas.   
But such accounts of legal change are too easy.  Law does not respond to 
instrumental economic pressures by simply sacrificing its internal rules, principles, 
and structures to an identified economic need or a lobbyist’s financial interests.  
                                                     
17 See ibid, 160-166. See, for example, J. Cox, citing Marsh, observing that ‘[b]ecause conflicts of interests 
are endemic to the commercial setting that the corporation calls home, pragmatism prevailed over what 
was believed unsubstantiated fears of self-interested behavior. Courts seriously tempered their earlier 
approaches to conflict of interest transactions’. ‘Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: 
Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel’ (2004) 48 Villanova Law Review 1077, 
1079. 
18  See, eg, M.J. Whincop, An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate Law (Sydney: Ashgate, 
2001), 2, observing that ‘the developments in case law emanating from the Delaware courts are marked 
by a conscious sense of consequence. Cases are not always decided as economists would like, but the 
courts recognize the importance of their decisions for corporate governance. By contrast […] [English] 
courts retreated from a cautious pragmatism to a sometimes arid formalism’. 
19 Compare for example two duty-of-care cases: in the UK Re D’Jan [1993] BCC 646 and in Delaware In 
re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation 907 A 2d 693 (Del Ch 2005).  
20 See G. Miller, ‘Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of Contrast Between the 
United States and England’ (1998) 1 Columbia Business Law Review 52, arguing that corporate legal 
federalism and its absence in the UK is primary driver of legal difference in takeover law and derivative 
action regulation. See, generally, on the state of regulatory competition in Europe: W.W. Bratton, ‘How 
Does Corporate Mobility Affect Law Making? A Comparative Analysis’ in D. Prentice and A. Reisberg 
(eds), Corporate Finance Law in The UK And EU (Oxford: OUP, 2011); J. Armour, ‘Who Should Make 
Corporate Law? EU Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 369. 
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Rather it engages with such needs and pressures through the existing rules, 
principles, and structures of the legal system. These systemic components 
contribute to, and are therefore determinative of, how law responds to these 
pressures: the path that law crafts through interaction with those pressures. US 
corporate law did not and cannot throw up its arms and say, ‘This set of self-
dealing rules do not respond to the needs of the market place; let’s have a different 
set of rules.’ It cannot say, ‘We need to completely change the rule set to 
accommodate our primary constituency.’ Legal changes and adjustments, even 
pursued by the most instrumental of lawmakers who themselves would like to re-
write the rule book, must benefit from a façade of legitimacy and must be 
proffered in ways that are consistent or explained by reference to existing internal 
rules, principles, and structures.  If the legal historian finds that no reason is given 
for an apparently profound legal change such as the shift from voidability to 
fairness in self-dealing law, it is likely that the lawmakers who made the changes 
did not view the shift as profound at all, and we need to dig deeper to account not 
for legal change but continuity.   
To explain the divergence of UK and US self-dealing law we need delve 
deeper into their apparently shared starting points.. Both jurisdictions started with 
a blank sheet of paper – there were no rules on self-dealing in the corporate code 
and no prior common law rules dealing with generally incorporated companies, 
which did not exist until the mid-19th century. Furthermore, both jurisdictions 
borrowed from the same source of legal ideas to address corporate self-dealing: 
fiduciary law contained within English trust law and agency law authorities. 
However, the background set of core systemic characteristics of US and UK 
corporate law, with which they translated these source materials into the corporate 
context, were not the same; they were profoundly different. Most importantly in 
this regard were the respective jurisdiction's divergent conceptions of the 
corporation. 
In the UK a generally incorporated company, known as a registered 
company, was viewed conceptually as the continuation of what were known as 
unincorporated or deed of settlement companies. These were effectively large-
scale partnerships, formed by using contract and trusts law, which were widely 
used prior to the availability of general incorporation. The general incorporated 
company was not viewed as a paradigm shift in the form of business organisation 
but merely as a means of addressing some of the practical difficulties associated 
with the unincorporated company.  Following the introduction of general 
incorporation, the incorporated company continued to be perceived as the 
product of private partnership and enterprise. It followed therefore that the UK 
incorporated company was viewed from inception as the endogenous product of 
private contract, and, accordingly, the rules imposed on the company to regulate 
its governance were open to variation at the election of the shareholders. 
Importantly, the powers of the directors were also a function of this corporate 
contract. Stripped of the formal complications engendered by the creation of a 
separate legal entity, power in a UK company was understood to be delegated 
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directly from shareholders to directors, who then formed the board. This 
contractual conception of the governance of a UK company operated as the safety 
value for instrumental economic pressures in multiple contexts, including self-
dealing, allowing directors and shareholders to mould governance rules to their 
preferences, thereby relieving the courts from the need to respond to these 
pressures and allowing, without consequence, inflexible rules to ossify. 
In the United States general incorporation was viewed as an extension of 
statutory chartering. Each generally incorporated company was viewed as a 
product of legislative action; the state’s creation and empowerment of an entity 
and its empowerment of a board of directors. This understanding of the 
corporation placed clear limits on the extent to which the parties themselves could 
change the rules: what stockholders had not given, they could not take away 
without the authority of the state to do so. Accordingly, responses to external 
pressure to allow self-dealing transactions had to come from within the law itself. 
However, US state courts did not respond by tearing up and re-writing the rules, 
rather they responded in different, internally consistent, and jurisdictionally-
specific ways. The juxtaposition of UK and US self-dealing law enables us to see 
US self-dealing law in a clearer light. It allows us to see that the path of US self-
dealing law from voidability to fairness is not illogical and unexplained and is not 
therefore open to crude economic forces accounts of legal change. On the 
contrary, the path to fairness is logical and consistent with the early 19th century 
fiduciary law and consistent with the options made available by the U.S 
conception of the corporation.  
The analysis in this article does not directly address claims about the influence 
of charter competition on US corporate law, but it generates, as a by-product, a 
dose of scepticism about its relevance. Claims about horizontal competitive 
pressures on Delaware lawmakers have generally resisted providing a granular 
account of how the common law is changed by such pressures.  This is hardly 
surprising as the nature of such effects means that one can rarely identify a single 
case or event to demonstrate increased managerial bias or lawmakers resisting 
managerial bias to ensure that the governance rules maximise value in the eyes of 
smart arbitrageurs. But it does mean that rules over time must gravitate to 
particular positions that support the claim. Importantly, this time period starts 
from the advent of the competition. If the change occurs prior to the starting gun, 
then charter competition is irrelevant. The timeline established by the analysis in 
this article does not support the claim of any significant charter competition effect 
in the self-dealing context because a strong case can be made that fairness review 
was established before the charter competition process was kick-started by New 
Jersey in 1889.21 
                                                     
21 Typically the starting point for charter competition is identified as 1889 when New Jersey enacted a 
statute allowing corporations to own stock in other corporations, or as of 1896 when New Jersey adopted 
what is often viewed as the first modern corporation code. However, see C.M. Yablon, ‘The Historical 
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A short road map of the article: Part I sets forth an account of the 
conceptions of the corporation in the United Kingdom and the United States with 
particular regard to the extent to which corporate governance rules were deemed 
to be contractable. Part II sets forth the article’s thesis through a detailed 
consideration of the evolution of self-dealing law in the United Kingdom and in 
the three most (historically) important US jurisdictions: New Jersey, New York, 




I THE CONCEPTION OF THE CORPORATION 
 
A. THE UK: A CONTRACTUAL CONCEPTION OF THE COMPANY 
 
Prior to the introduction of general incorporation, in the UK large-scale business 
activity was carried out through unincorporated associations or companies which, 
for legal purposes, were in effect large-scale partnerships. These unincorporated 
companies were legally constructed through an innovative combination of trust 
law and contract law. The assets of the company were vested in trustees and 
directors of the unincorporated company (who were typically different individuals 
than the trustees)22 who were appointed and empowered to manage and deploy 
those assets in accordance with a contract – the deed of settlement – entered into 
by all the ‘partners’/’members’ in the unincorporated association. The directors’ 
powers over the unincorporated company’s assets were a direct function of the 
provisions set forth in this deed of settlement. These companies were often 
referred to as ‘deed of settlement companies.’ 
There were multiple practical problems associated with carrying out business 
through an unincorporated company, including, in particular, the difficulties 
involved in taking legal action in the company’s own name23 and the problem of 
unlimited member liability which, although partially managed through contract, 
could never be fully excluded.24 The UK legislature in the early 19th century was 
                                                                                                                                       
Race Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey 1880-1910’ (2007) 32 
Journal of Corporation Law 323, arguing that the process started as early as 1880 although observing that: ‘In 
the decade from 1880 to 1889, there was not yet any public recognition that New Jersey, or any other 
state, had become a particularly popular state in which to incorporate, although there is evidence of a 
different perception among knowledgeable business professionals.’ 333. Arguably West Virginia tried the 
‘charter mongering’ strategy first in 1888 but to little avail: See C. Grandy who argues that prior to 1890 
New Jersey Corporate law was ‘focused on firms operating within the state’: New Jersey and the Fiscal 
Origins of Modern American Corporation Law (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), 43. See also W.W. 
Bratton and J.A. McCahery, ‘The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism’ (2006) 41 Wake Forest 
Law Review 619. 
22 L.S. Sealy, ‘The Director as Trustee’ (1967) Cambridge Law Journal 83, 84. 
23 M. Lobban, 'Corporate Identity and Limited Liability in France and England 1825-67' 25 Anglo-
American Law Review 397, 404. 
24 On the pre-general incorporation construction of an 'entity' through trust and contract see J. Getzler 
and M. Macnair, The Firm as an Entity Before the Companies Acts' in P. Brand et al (eds), Adventures of 
the Law: Proceedings of the Sixteenth British Legal History Conference (Dublin, Four Courts Press 2005). 
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clearly cognisant of these practical problems. Indeed, the introduction in the UK 
of general incorporation – known in the UK as incorporation by registration – 
through the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, which did not provide for limited 
liability,25 can be viewed as one step in a continuum of legislative steps designed to 
incrementally address some of these practical problems. Accordingly, the broad 
availability of the corporate form through a simple form filling registration process 
was not viewed as an organisational paradigm shift – from partnership to separate 
legal entity – but rather as a means of addressing the practical problems of existing 
institutions.26 
The legislative steps prior to the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 included 
providing the Crown with the authority to grant letters patent to enable the 
unincorporated company to sue in the name of the company through a ‘public 
official’27 and, thereafter, allowing banking companies to appoint such a ‘public 
official’ through a registration process.28  For such unincorporated companies with 
an appointed ‘public official’ Lord Justice Lindley, the 19th century’s leading 
English company law scholar and senior judge, observed that they could ‘without 
any great inaccuracy be likened to a corporation.’29  
For scholars of Lord Lindley’s generation the term ‘company’ was the 
umbrella term applying to both unincorporated and incorporated companies 
which were, roughly speaking, viewed as different forms of partnership and which 
were, to a significant extent, subject to the same legal architecture of contract and 
trust law that governed a partnership. In his treatise on company law, which is 
tellingly entitled A Treatise on the Law of Companies as a Branch of the Law of 
Partnerships, he refers to companies incorporated by registration as ‘partnerships 
incorporated by registration’.30 Francis Palmer, a leading 19th century 
commentator on company law, observed that the unincorporated company was 
                                                     
25 Limited liability for companies incorporated by registration was not introduced until the Limited 
Liability Act of 1855.  
26 See Lord Cranworth in Oakes v Turquand L.R. 2 H.L., explaining that the companies acts were a 
response to the fact that ‘the ordinary provisions of the law of this country were ill adapted to the 
business of such bodies’. Gladstone on requesting leave from the House of Commons to move a bill on 
the Joint Stock Companies observed that the bill would ‘not change the course of the law, but rather 
accelerated it; because, in the present state of the law, Joint-Stock Companies had, under the pressure of 
absolute necessity, extorted, piecemeal, from the courts of law, a recognition of their distinct existence; 
and, without any strictly statutory title, they had become, to all intents and purposes, recognized creatures 
in the eye of the law’. HC Deb 02 April vol 73 cc 1754-8. 
27 4 & 5 Wm. 4, c 94. N. Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of Partnerships, Including its Application to Companies 
(Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1878), 9. 
28 Commencing in 1826 with The Banking Act 1826 (7 Geo. 4, c.46), enabling joint stock unincorporated 
banking companies to appoint a public officer in whose name the bank could sue and be sued.  
29 See ibid, 2.   
30 See ibid, 8. Note that this book involves the breaking out of the section on companies found originally 
in his A Treatise On The Law of Partnerships, Including its Application to Companies, n 27 above. The section in 
Hansard, the official publication of the Houses of Parliament, where permission is granted to bring the 
Joint Stock Companies Bill forward is sub-headed, The Law of Partnership, HC Deb 02 April 1844 Vol. 73 
cc 1754-8. 
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the ‘lineal ancestor of the ordinary company’ formed under the Companies Acts.31 
Companies, whether incorporated or unincorporated, were distinct from 
corporations. Corporations ‘in the proper sense of the term’ were the product of 
state action – through Crown charter or statutory charter.32  
This view of incorporated companies reflected the position encoded within 
the general incorporation legislation. In the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act, the 
‘joint stock company,’ which the Act requires are registered and incorporated, is 
defined to include ‘every partnership whereof the capital is divided or agreed to be 
divided into shares, and so as to be transferable without the express consent of all 
the co-partners […] and every partnership which at its formation or by subsequent 
admission […] shall consist of more than 25 members’.33 The 1844 Act required as 
a precondition to registration the production of a ‘deed of settlement’ signed by 
the shareholders just as an unincorporated company would be formed by the 
members signing a deed of settlement.34 The 1844 Act provided, as was typical in 
unincorporated companies, that the deed of settlement contain a covenant on the 
part of the shareholders to observe the terms of the deed.35 Section 11 of the 1862 
Companies Act – an Act which consolidated the Acts regulating companies 
enacted between 1844 and 1856 and which is viewed as the UK’s first major piece 
of companies legislation36 – similarly provided that the memorandum of 
association37 is a contract binding on the members and members inter se.38 
However, this provision did not provide that the company, in addition to the 
shareholders, was bound to observe the contract.39 The failure to notice the legal 
entity is instructive: corporate personality was a means of addressing identified 
practical problems associated with the unincorporated company and was not 
intended to alter the legal relationships amongst those who invested in or carried 
                                                     
31 F.B. Palmer, Company Law: A Practical Handbook for Lawyers & Business Men (4th ed, 1902), 5. 
32 N. Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of Companies Considered as a Branch of the Law of Partnerships (6th ed, 1902): 
‘corporations in the proper sense of the term […] these must be created by royal charter or by Act of 
Parliament and to them the law of ordinary partnerships has little if any application’. See also ibid (5th 
ed), 8, 57, 102.  
33 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, § 2, 7, 8 Victoria. 
34 ibid, § 3. 
35 ibid, § 7: ‘And such deed must contain a covenant on the part of every shareholder, and a trustee on 
the part of every company, to perform the several engagements contained in the deed on the part of the 
shareholders.’ 
36 Palmer, n 31 above, 1, referring to the 1862 Act as company law’s ‘Magna Carta’. 
37 25 & 26 Victoria, Cap. 89. The 1862 Act replaced the deed of settlement with the memorandum of 
association and the articles of association. Prior to 2006, the Memorandum of association was the 
primary constitutional document akin to a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation. Today the 
memorandum of association is merely a formation document and the primary constitutional document is 
the articles of association – see §§8 and 17 Companies Act 2006. 
38 The 1862 Act, § 11 provided, ‘It shall, when registered bind the company and the members thereof to 
the same extent as if each member had subscribed his name and affixed his seal thereto, and there were in 
the memorandum contained, on the part of himself, his airs, executors and administrators, a covenant to 
observe all the conditions of such memorandum subject to the provisions of this Act.’ 
39 Note that the courts, unsurprisingly, held that the company was also bound as if it had covenanted to 
observe the terms of the contract – Wood v Odessa Waterworks Company (1889) 42 Ch. 636. 
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out the business of the company, which were set forth in deed of settlement 
entered into by the shareholders.40 
The introduction of incorporation by registration did not simply involve legal 
conceptual continuity but also, for the business, chronological factual continuity. 
That is, the starting point for the business was not the creation of the corporate 
entity; rather business activity and the company were understood to be prior to 
incorporation. Hence the vocabulary of ‘registration’. Gladstone,41 requesting 
leave to move the Joint Stock Companies Bill in 1844, described the Bill’s 
objective as ‘for the registration of joint-stock companies and conferring on such 
companies certain privileges of corporate bodies’.42 
Through this dominant lens of factual and conceptual continuity, the English 
incorporated company was viewed predominantly as private: the product of 
endogenous business activity.  The role of the state in creating the incorporated 
entity was side-lined. Accordingly, UK legislators and commentators in the 19th 
century did not envisage the corporate form as a concession43 of the state, 
empowered by the state. In the UK there was no 19th century legal debate, as 
there was in the United States,44 about whether or not a general corporate charter 
represented a contract between the corporation and the state; whether the 
corporate charter amounted to a legislative act. References to the relationship 
between the state and the corporation in leading 19th century UK corporate law 
texts are absent.45   
However, this dominant bias towards the private did not completely disregard 
the public nature of incorporation. Incorporation created a legal entity that 
benefited from limited liability, which was viewed as a privilege and not the 
statutory rubber stamping of something that could be achieved by contract.46 It 
was understood that limited liability generated risks for the public and, in 
particular, for the creditors and that legal protections were therefore required.  
These protections were provided by restricting what incorporated companies 
could do through an unalterable memorandum of association – the primary 
constitutional document. This memorandum, which was not alterable at all until 
                                                     
40 A similar provision is found today in § 33(1) of the Companies Act 2006, but one that treats the 
shareholders and the company as contractually bound.  
41 In 1844 William Gladstone was a minister and President of the Board of Trade. He later served as 
Prime Minister four times between 1868 and 1894. 
42 HC Deb 02 April vol 73 cc 1754-8. 
43 References to concession can at times be found particular when the interests of creditors are 
concerned. See Ashbury Railway Carriage Co. v Riche [1874-80] All ER Rep Ext (2219). 
44 See, for example, S.D. Thompson, On The Law of Private Corporations, Vol 1 (1895), 55-77. 
45 Lindley, n 32 above, and Palmer, n 31 above. The only context in which the idea of legislative 
authorisation is foregrounded in early English company law is in relation to the capacity of the company 
and acts that are ultra vires the company. See Ashbury Railway Carriage Co. v Riche, n 43 above. 
46  On the adoption of limited liability in the UK, see M.-L. Djelic, ‘When Limited Liability Was (Still) An 
Issue: Conflicting Mobilisations in Nineteenth Century England’ (European Group for Organization 
Studies Working Paper, 2011).  
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1890 unless specifically permitted by the statute,47 contained information, among 
others, about the company’s business objects, its limited liability, its name, and its 
share capital.48 The permissions and restrictions of the memorandum were viewed 
through a public lens. Indeed courts would sometimes refer to the memorandum 
in this context as a ‘charter.’49 However, these restrictions on contractibility50 did 
not apply to the governance of the corporation which was left to the subsidiary 
constitutional document, the articles of association, which could be altered at any 
time by super majority shareholder resolution.51  
With regard to corporate governance the continuity from the contractual 
underpinnings of the unincorporated company to the incorporated company was 
untrammelled. How directors were appointed and removed, when shareholder 
meetings could be called, the extent of the powers of the directors, and the 
directors’ obligations to the company were subject to specification and variation 
by the corporate contract. Consider, for example, director power, removal of the 
directors, and duty of care liability waivers. 
With regard to director power, the 1844 Act explicitly empowers the 
directors.52 However, directors’ powers ‘to conduct and manage the affairs of the 
company’ are not provided directly by the statute but provided ‘according to the 
provisions and […] restrictions’ of the Act and the corporate contract: the deed of 
settlement.53 That is, the statute delegates board empowerment to the shareholder 
contract. The Companies Act 1862 went further than this and did not provide for 
director power at all.54 Rather, as with an unincorporated deed of settlement 
company, the directors were empowered by the shareholders through the 
                                                     
47 The Companies (Memorandum of Association Act) 1890 enabled the amendment of the memorandum 
with court approval for one of seven specified reasons. § 1(5). Prior to 1890 the memorandum could only 
be altered to increase capital, decrease capital in accordance with the Companies Act 1867, to subdivide 
its shares, or change its name.  
48 This meant that while capital could be raised, it could not be reduced, and any activity undertaken 
outside of its stated objects was void ab initio, Ashbury Railways v Riche (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653. The 
Companies Act 1867 allowed for court controlled capital reductions. See, generally, D. Kershaw, ‘The 
Decline of Legal Capital: An Exploration of the Implications of Board Solvency-Based Capital 
Reductions’ in A. Reisberg and D. Prentice (eds), Corporate Finance in the UK and US (Oxford: OUP, 
forthcoming in 2011). 
49 Ashbury Railways v Riche, ibid, 668. 
50 See Whincop, n 18 above, first using the term ‘contractibility’ to characterise the UK’s approach to 
corporate law.  
51 Lord Cairns, in Ashbury Railways v Riche, n 48 above, observed in this regard, ‘With regard to the articles 
of association, those articles play a part subsidiary to the memorandum of association. They accept the 
memorandum of association as the charter of incorporation of the company, and so accepting it, the 
articles proceed to define the duties, the rights and the powers of the governing body as between 
themselves and the company at large, and the mode and form in which the business of the company is to 
be carried on, and the mode and form in which changes in the internal regulations of the company may 
from time to time be made.’ 
52 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, § 27. 
53 ibid, § 23. It is noteworthy that the deed of settlement did not allow shareholders through the deed of 
settlement to retain powers of ordinary management. 
54 Model Articles issued through secondary legislation and known as ‘Table A Articles’ provided for the 
delegation of corporate power and authority to the board to manage and direct the company. In the 
absence of general or specific (in relation to particular articles) contrary intent on the formation of the 
company, such model articles would be adopted by the company. 
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company’s constitution, a document which could only be altered by the members 
and, as contrasted with most US jurisdictions, in relation to which the board had 
no amendment veto.55 Accordingly, for a UK incorporated company director 
power was not original but clearly delegated by the shareholders through the 
constitutional documents. Palmer's Company law observed that the 1862 Act 
‘leaves the members entirely free to determine how and by whom the business 
shall be managed.’56 Note also that power, pursuant to the 1844 Act, and 
subsequent model articles of association, is delegated to the directors and not to 
the board of directors.  
Accordingly, from the inception of incorporation by registration a UK 
incorporated company may have been created by a process of registration, but its 
ability to function through representative directors was dependent upon what 
powers the shareholders were willing to confer through contract. Contract was, 
and is, at the heart of the conception of the corporation in the UK and at the heart 
of board power. In Ernest v Nichols,57 a case dealing with a company formed under 
the 1844 Act, counsel for the appellants who were challenging the legality of a sale 
of all the company's assets to a company controlled by the company’s directors 
argued that ‘directors are trustees for their shareholders and have no power 
whatever beyond what is given them by their deed of trust’. Agreeing with 
counsel, Lord Wensleydale held that the deed ‘restrict[ed] and regulate[d] their 
authority’.58  
With regard to director removal, until the Companies Act 1947 there was no 
statutory provision dealing with the removal of directors.59 Removal was dealt 
with by the corporate contract, which could be fashioned in any way that the 
shareholders determined, but once fashioned it would be enforced by the courts 
until amended by the shareholders. Nineteenth century courts made it clear that 
there was no inherent power of removal as an incident of the corporate entity; 
there was simply the corporate contract. ‘You must look,’ held Lord Justice 
Bowen in Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Company vHampson, ‘when you are considering 
the question of dismissal of a director, to see whether the articles of association 
have been complied with.’60  
Contractibility extended beyond director appointment and removal to all 
aspects of the directors' actions. Below we shall consider this in detail in the 
context of self-dealing. Even the duty of care was viewed as being legitimately 
contractible. It was common practice in UK companies until 192961 to include 
duty of care liability waivers in the articles of association, similar to those that are 
                                                     
55 See, for example, the General Corporation Act of New Jersey (revision of 1896), § 27, providing for 
board and shareholder approval. 
56 Palmer, n 31 above, 146. 
57 (1857) 6 HLC 401.  
58 8 App. Cas (1882).   
59 Companies Act 1947, § 29m, subsequently consolidated into the Companies Act 1948, § 184. 
60 (1882) 23 Ch.D.1. 
61 See In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations [1911] 1 Ch 425. 
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now permitted in Delaware pursuant to Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporate Law. However, these waivers did not require statutory permission, but 
were found by the courts to be enforceable.62 The courts’ determination that they 
were enforceable in the litigation arising out of a major insurance fraud resulted in 
the legislature amending the Companies Act to render such waivers void.63 
Statutory action was required to constrain the underpinning contractibility of UK 
company law.   
 
B. THE UNITED STATES: A PUBLIC CONCEPTION OF THE CORPORATION 
 
1. Incorporation as state and private action   
Above we have seen that English company law viewed the incorporated company 
and its governance structure less as the product of public action but more as 
public gloss on existing private activity. This contrasted with the perception of the 
chartered or statutory company, which were corporations ‘in the proper sense of 
the term’64 and which clearly involved the state’s direct top-down facilitation of 
public or private activity.  
In contrast, in the United States the introduction of general corporation 
statutes was viewed as an extension of the power of states to grant corporate 
charters.65 Although the granting of individual statutory charters was relatively 
commonplace for trading corporations,66 at least when compared to the UK,67 it 
was widely seen as a process infected by corruption, patronage and rent seeking.68  
General incorporation addressed such problems by effectively making statutory 
chartering available on compliance with prescribed formalities.  When states began 
enacting general incorporation statutes from the mid-1800s.69 these were viewed as 
a democratic extension of statutory chartering; a more readily assessable form of 
statutory chartering.70 Accordingly, the legal conception of the specifically 
chartered corporation as a creature of legislative action, the statutory grant of a 
                                                     
62 In re City Equitable Fire [1925] Ch. 407. 
63 Companies Act 1929, § 129. 
64 Lindley, n 32 above, 8. 
65 See J.K. Angell and S. Ames, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate (7th ed, 1861), ch II, 
treating statutory companies and generally incorporated companies as different exercises of state power. 
66 ibid, 47: ‘In no country, indeed, have corporations been multiplied to so great an extent, as in our own; 
and the extent to which their institution has here been carried, may very properly be pronounced 
astonishing.’ 
67 Angell and Ames, n 65 above, 41, observe, for example, that ‘it has never been the policy in England, 
as in this country to adopt, as a practice the conferring of full and unqualified corporate privileges upon a 
body of men associated for the purposes of trade. Corporations have occasionally been permitted, in 
England, to engross some business to the exclusion of natural persons […]’. 
68 M.J. Horwitz, ‘Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory’ (1985) 88 West Virginia 
Law Review 175, 181; J.W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-
1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), 9. 
69 See the list of General incorporation statutes provided in Justice Brandies’ judgment in Liggett Co. v Lee 
288 U.S. 517 (1933).  On the types of statute for the different industries see Thompson, n 44 above, 99-
126. 
70 V. Morawetz, The Law of Private Corporations (1882), 17. 
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privilege or franchise,71 naturally applied to the generally incorporated company.   
In State v Penn-Beaver Oil Co Chief Justice Pennewill of the Delaware Supreme 
Court observed that ‘the defendant corporation was organised under the general 
incorporation law of the state, but its legal status would have been the same if it 
had been created by a special act of the legislature’.72 This conception is, of course, 
very well known. Every student of corporate law in the United States is familiar 
with Justice Marshall’s definition and conception of the corporation set forth in 
Dartmouth College v Woodward,73 a case involving a specifically chartered company. 
‘A corporation’ he held was ‘creature of law’, an ‘artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it 
possesses only those properties, which the charter of its creation confers upon it, 
either expressly or as incidental to its very existence’.  
While there is much discussion in the US literature on whether the 
conception of the corporation described by Justice Marshall evolved and changed 
during the course of the 19th century,74 what is clear is that the presence of the 
state as the creator of the corporation hardly recedes during this period.  Writing 
in 1861 Angell and Ames distinguish a partnership from a corporation by noting 
that the latter involves confirmation of the coming together of property and 
labour by an ‘indispensible’ ‘special legislative authority’;75 a corporation is ‘a body 
created by law composed of individuals’.76 Writing in 1895 Seymour Thompson 
commences his analysis of ‘Creation by Special Charters’ by observing that 
‘nothing less than sovereign power can create a corporation’.77 He commences the 
subsequent section on general incorporation, ‘Organisation under General Laws’, 
by observing that ‘a corporation can only be created by or under authority of a 
sovereign power, which in this country is expressed in the Acts of the 
Legislature’.78 For Cook, writing in 1898, ‘the state creates the corporation upon 
the application of individuals, who are called incorporators. The incorporators 
then organize the corporation.’79  Even Victor Morowetz, who is viewed by some 
commentators as being at the vanguard of late 19th century attempts to portray 
the corporation as an aggregation of private actors with much in common with a 
partnership,80 cannot avoid foregrounding the legislative act central to corporate 
                                                     
71 As Angell and Ames explain, the word ‘franchise’ is used by Blackstone ‘in its most extensive sense [to 
be] expressive of great political rights. It is in this sense that the word is applied by Blackstone, when 
defining a corporation, and not in the less general sense […] sense of the exclusive exercise of some 
right’. n 65 above, citing W. Blackstone, Commentaries On The Laws of England (1769), 37. 
72 34 Del. 81 (1926). 
73  17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
74  See Horwitz, n 68 above. See, generally, J.C. Coates IV, ‘State Takeover Statutes and Corporate 
Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate’ (1989) 64 New York University Law Review 806.  
75 Angell and Ames, n 65 above, 32. 
76 ibid, 1. 
77 n 44 above, 31. 
78 ibid, 127.  
79 W. Cook, A Treatise on the Law of Corporations Having Capital Stock (4th ed, 1898), 6. 
80 Horwitz, n 68 above, citing Morawetz in support of the proposition that ‘up until the 1880s there was a 
strong tendency to analyze corporation law not very differently from the partnership’. Note that as 
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creation. For Morawetz a corporation is formed only ‘when authorised by an Act 
of the legislature’ and supports this position with a quotation from Cowen J in 
Thomas v Dakin on the distinction between a partnership and a corporation:81 
 
The difference consists in this: the former are authorised by the general law 
among natural persons exercising their ordinary powers; the latter by a special 
authority, usually if not necessarily emanating from the legislature conferring 
privileges. 
 
As a consequence of viewing general incorporation as a logical extension of 
statutory chartering, the charter of a generally incorporated company was viewed 
both as a legislative act – even though some of the terms of the charter, pursuant 
to the Act, are filled in by the by the incorporators – and as a compact or contract 
between the state and the corporation.  Angell and Ames observed in this regard 
‘that private corporations are created by an act of the legislature, which, in 
connection with its acceptance is regarded as a compact, and one which, so long as 
the body corporate faithfully observes, the legislature is constitutionally restrained 
from impairing’.82 In the Missouri case of O’Brien v Cummings,83 the Court 
observed that ‘the law and the articles of association become, as it were, the 
compact between the state and the association, and this constitutes the charter of 
the body politic’. The New Jersey Court of Chancery in Ellerman v Chicago Junction 
Railways & Union Stock Yards Co.84 held that: 
 
The constitution providing that ‘the legislature shall pass general laws under 
which corporations may be organized, and corporate powers of every nature 
obtained,’ and the General Corporation Act being, as it now stands, passed in 
obedience to the mandate of the constitution, the certificate required by that 
Act becomes the charter of the company, and the equivalent of the former special 
act of the legislature (emphasis supplied). 
 
The prominent presence of the state does not, of course, crowd out the idea of the 
corporation as the aggregation of business and investor interests and participants, 
which is a central component of the conception of the American generally 
incorporated corporation.  This aggregate component of the corporation is 
present in the early pre-general incorporation case law and is hard-wired into the 
earliest of general incorporation statutes. In the 1841 New York case of The Bank 
                                                                                                                                       
addressed in the next section, if at the heart of partnership is contract, the US corporation was not 
understood in partnership terms in the 19th century. Note also that Morawetz’s view was not widely held 
by other commentators. Ames writing an extremely complementary review of the second edition of 
Morawetz’s text observed that ‘we should be glad to see some modification of his fundamental 
conception of the nature of the corporation’. (1887) 1 Harvard Law Review 110. 
81 22 Wend. 9. (1839). Morawetz, n 70 above, 8. 
82 Angell and Ames, n 65 above, 22.   
83 13 Mo. App. 197 (1883). 
84 49 N.J. Eq. 217 (1891). 
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of Watertown v The Assessors of the Village of Watertown the court held that ‘a 
corporation aggregate is a collection of individuals united in one body under a 
grant, securing a succession of members without changing the identity of the 
body, and constituting the members one artificial person capable of transacting 
business of some kind like a natural person’.  Section 1 of the New York Act 
Authorising the Formation of Corporation for Manufacturing, Mining and Mechanical and 
Chemical Purposes of 1848 provides that ‘any three or more persons may form 
themselves into a corporation in the manner specified and required in and by the Act’ 
(emphasis supplied).85  But for commentators of this period aggregate is always 
enveloped in state action. Consider Thompson Seymour’s Commentaries on the Law 
of Private Corporations in this regard: 
 
The most usual conception of a corporation is that it is a collection of natural 
persons, joined together by their voluntary action or by legal compulsion, by 
or under the authority of an act of the legislature, to accomplish some purpose, 
pecuniary ideal, or governmental, authorised by the legislature, under a scheme of 
organisation and by methods thereby prescribed or permitted (emphasis supplied).  
 
The fact that the corporation is in some notable respect the product of state action 
is trivial if not banal within US corporate legal discourse. But, comparatively, when 
juxtaposed next to the legal conception of the UK company, this focus on the role 
of the state is shown to be a distinctive aspect of the conception of the US 
corporation. In the United States the corporation is a different creature than it is 
in the United Kingdom: in the US, a private entity that is firmly contained within 
the orbit of public creation; in the UK an endogenous private association assisted 
by the state provision of entity status in order to address some of the practical 
difficulties associated with unincorporated business activity. Accordingly, in 
contrast to the UK in the US there is neither general incorporation statutes nor in 
any 19th century commentaries any sense of organisational continuity resulting 
from the incorporation of large-scale unincorporated business activity. Nor is 
there any sense of regulatory continuity with the legal rules and structures 
governing such unincorporated entities.  
 
2. Non-contractibility 
Some commentators have argued that early corporate law in the United States was 
heavily influenced by partnership law.  This is incorrect. At its heart partnership 
law is rooted in contract: the provision of default rules that may be contractually 
                                                     
85 A provision that bears a close resemblance to the UK Companies Acts association clause. See, for 
example, the Companies Act 1862, § 6: ‘Any seven or more persons associated for any lawful purpose 
may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association […] form an incorporated company 
with or without unlimited liability.’ 
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varied by the members.86 Yet the contractibility of US corporate law in the 19th 
century was significantly attenuated. Of course, the by-laws of the corporation, 
which provided for ‘the government of [the corporations] members and officers in 
the management of its affairs’, delegated significant rule-making authority to 
shareholders, and in some instances directors.  However, the by-laws were a 
subordinate constitutional document responsible primarily for regulating the 
procedural aspects of corporate activity.87 Corporation statutes made it clear that 
to the extent to which the constitution was capable of addressing the core issues 
of the power and authority of the board and the obligations of the directors, they 
must be addressed through the certificate and only to the extent permitted by the 
statute. Governance was not, as it was in the UK, left to contract. 
Arguably, this stance follows logically, in both the US and the UK, from the 
allocation of corporate power to the board.  In the UK corporate power is located 
with the shareholders and its distribution left to the shareholder contract. It 
follows then that the rules relating to the exercise of that power should similarly 
be subject to the same contract. In the United States board power was addressed 
in the statute.88 The statute created and empowered the corporation and the 
board, and it necessarily followed that only the statute could permit variation of 
the power distribution and the rules associated with the exercise of power.  
Typically statutes provided for variation. However, the courts policed the power 
of variation very restrictively, in many instances striking down attempted 
contractual variation of governance rules. 
The reasons why courts refused to allow contractibility in relation to certain 
governance rules, and the reasons why market participants appear to have been 
less aggressive than their UK counterparts89 in attempting to contract around the 
prevailing rules, are rooted in the idea that the corporation’s structure and the 
power and obligations of the board are the product of public / state action and 
therefore cannot be amended without the explicit permission of the state.  In the 
                                                     
86 N. Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of Partnership (5th ed, 1888), 2, observing that ‘[p]artnership, although 
often called a contract, is in truth the result of a contract; the relation which subsists between persons 
who have agreed to share the profits of some business’ in UK partnership law. C. Bates, The Law of 
Partnership (1888), 2, observing that ‘[p]artnership is a contract relation […] an agreement of partnership, 
like any other contract must be founded on a consideration either of mutual promises or contributions’ in 
US partnership law. 
87 The General Corporation Law of New Jersey 1896, § 1(4). 
88 For example, the New York Act to Authorize the Formation of Companies for Manufacturing 
Purposes 1848, § 3 provided that ‘the stock property and concerns of such company shall be managed by 
not less than three, not more than thirteen, trustees’. In New York, The Act to Provide For the 
Organization and Regulation of Certain Business Corporations of 1875 [as amended as of 1881], § 10   
provided that ‘[t]he business of every corporation shall be managed by a board of directors’. In New 
Jersey The Act Concerning Corporations in the State of New Jersey [as amended as of 1892], § 16 
provided that ‘the business of every such company, shall be managed and conducted by the directors’. 
The New Jersey Corporation Act of 1896, § 12 provided that ‘the business of every corporation shall be 
managed by its directors’. In Plaguemines Tropical Fruit Co. v Buck N.J. Eq. 219 (1893), the court observed 
that ‘the board of directors is the legal executive as such, not only in practice and on principle, but by the 
statute’. 
89 This conclusion is based on the limited number of cases addressing the contractibility of core 
governance rules such as variation of, or liability waivers for breach of, fiduciary duties.  
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New Jersey case of Audenried v East Coast Milling Co,90 the Chancery Court 
considered the East Coast Milling Company’s charter amendment which 
purported to opt-out of the ‘eminently wise and just’ common law rule requiring 
the board to take action through collective, real-time board action rather than 
allowing a decision to be taken by each director giving separate written consent.91  
The starting point for the Court was the New Jersey Corporation Act and the 
extent to which it could be interpreted to allow such adjustments: to what extent 
had the New Jersey Corporation Act granted the incorporators who had amended 
the charter ‘the power to legislate’?  
The New Jersey Corporation Act, as revised in 1896 and amended in 1898, 
contained a provision, which today is found in the same form in section 102(b)(1) 
of today’s Delaware General Corporation Law, providing that the certificate could 
contain provisions ‘creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the 
corporation, the directors and the stockholders […] provided such provision be 
not inconsistent with this Act’.92 The words ‘creating’ and ‘defining’ were added in 
1898, prior to which, by implication, an amendment that did anything but limit 
powers of the corporation and the directors was not authorised by the statute.93  A 
literal reading of this provision would suggest that a charter provision providing 
for written board resolutions could clearly fall within the regulation of the powers 
of the corporation and the directors. However, the court in Audenried rejected such 
a broad reading, and held, narrowly, that the provision allows variation of the 
powers of the corporation, not the method of exercising the power which ‘must 
conform to settled legal principles’. Any ability to contract out of such important 
principles must, according to the court, be expressly authorised by the legislature 
and was ‘not to be inferred from ambiguous expressions’. For the New Jersey 
Chancery Court these rules belonged to a structure of governance provided by the 
legislature designed to enable the corporation to function but also to protect the 
public interest implicated by incorporation. The fundamental building blocks of 
this structure are accordingly only alterable by the shareholders with the 
                                                     
90 68 NJ Eq 450 (1904). 
91 The court cited Clark and Marshall, Corporations 2074, § 677, and First Nat. BK of Ft. Scott v Drake, 35 
Kan. 564. 
92  New Jersey Corporation Act [as amended, 1898], § 8(VII). A similar provision was introduced into the 
New York Business Corporation Law and enabled amendments to the certificate which limited the 
powers of directors provided that such amendment ‘does not exempt [the directors] from any obligation 
or from the performance of any duty imposed by law’. New York Business Corporation Law, amended 
by the 1892 Act to amend the business corporation law, § 2(9).  
93  The words ‘creating’ and ‘defining’ were added by amendments to the 1896 Act passed in 1898. See 
J.D. Dill, Private Companies Under the General Corporation Act of New Jersey (New Jersey: treatise, 2nd ed, 
1899), 21, describing the provision as ‘one of the most important provisions of the Corporation Act’ and 
observing that it carried ‘to its logical result the principle laid down in Ellerman v. Chicago Junc. Rys., & Co. 
49 N.J. Eq. 217, that the certificate of incorporation is equivalent to a special act of the legislature’ and 
amounts to a ‘delegation to [incorporators] of the law making power of the legislature’. Provisions 
providing for the limitation of the powers of the corporation and the directors were introduced in New 
Jersey in 1889 and in New York in 1892, prior to which, by implication in relation to the powers of the 
corporation and the directors the certificate was not amendable at all.   
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legislature’s explicit authorisation to do so. Vice Chancellor Bergen in Audenried 
put this position as follows:   
 
The proposition that the stockholders, in assenting to this provision in the 
articles of association, waived the advantage and protection they would enjoy 
under the common law and our Corporation Act, does not meet the case. 
Stockholders may waive an advantage, but they cannot by waiver ordain a method of 
corporate action which the law does not recognize, nor dispense with the aid of a 
board of directors as a means of corporate action. Such a course is not 
sanctioned by our law, and is inconsistent with the twelfth section of our Act, 
which requires that ‘the business of every corporation shall be managed by its 
directors.’ But we ought not to confine the consideration of this question to the relationship 
existing between the stockholders and the directors. The business of the state is to a 
large extent carried on by corporations, and their transactions directly and 
vitally affect the interests of all the people. In committing the transaction of business 
so generally to corporations, the Legislature may be presumed to have provided for, and 
recognized deliberative meetings of directors as a safeguard to the public interest, 
which presumption ought not to be overthrown by a forced construction of 
the Act. The fundamental idea of a business corporation involves an advantage 
coming from the aggregation of wisdom, knowledge, and business foresight 
which results from bringing a large number of stockholders and directors into 
a common enterprise. It is their knowledge and wisdom combined, acting as a 
unit, that gives efficiency and safety to the corporate management. I am 
satisfied that the section of this charter now under consideration is contrary 
to the provisions of our Corporation Act, and that there is no express or 
implied authority conferred thereby which will allow a corporation to 
determine, in its articles of association, that its board of directors may avoid 
the performance of their duties in the manner required by the word and spirit 
of our act and the well-settled law on that subject. To permit it would ingraft 
upon the law a vicious and dangerous power, and in the absence of express 
legislative authority I am unwilling to sanction it (emphasis supplied).94 
 
Audenried shows that the state’s interests are necessary considerations when 
assessing the extent to which incorporators and shareholders can mould the 
governance structure of the corporation as set forth in the charter, the statute and 
the existing body of common law and equitable rules  – ‘the settled legal 
principles’ – applicable to the company.  While no attempt is made to define or 
enumerate the non-variable rules falling under the umbrella of ‘settled legal 
principle’, it is clear from the case law that the core rules and obligations 
associated with the exercise of corporate power and the office of a director fall 
within this category.  These rules are part and parcel of the legislative creation of 
the corporation. Corbin writing in 1892, in his annotated text on the New Jersey 
                                                     
94 Audenried v East Coast Milling Co, n 90 above. 
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Corporation Act observes, for example, that ‘duties required of an incorporated 
company are in the nature of conditions annexed to the grant of the franchise’,95 
Writers and judges in this period would have willingly extended this observation to 
the duties of directors as well as of corporations.96  
To be clear, it is not that such core rules are not variable at all but that they 
are variable only pursuant to an enabling permission set forth in the Corporation 
Law and only where, in the absence of the explicit authorisation of the legislature 
to do so, any variation pursuant to such permission does not vitiate a core 
governance rule and any protection it grants. Consider for example the Delaware 
case of State v Penn-Beaver Oil Co.,97 where a stockholder was denied access to 
inspect the corporation’s books and records based upon a provision in the charter 
which modified the stockholder’s common law inspection rights. The starting 
point for Chief Justice Pennewill of the Delaware Supreme Court, similar to the 
New Jersey Chancery Court in Audenried, was that such a provision would only be 
legitimate if authorised by the state through the Delaware General Corporation 
Law because if it was ‘it would be as effective as if the legislature had granted it by 
direct and special act’. The portal for answering this question was whether such a 
provision fell within the same enabling provision considered in Audienried, namely 
the power to create, define, and limit the powers of the corporation and the 
directors provided that such provisions were not contrary to the law of the state.98 
The court held that had a power of variation been applicable to this common law 
rule then the court would have expected the legislature to have granted this power 
explicitly. However, the legislature had not done so, and indeed ‘it probably would 
have been difficult, if not impossible, to induce the legislature to grant such a 
power’. Accordingly, the charter provision was invalid. 
Subsequent Delaware decisions have arguably struck a more lenient tone. In 
Sterling v Mayflower Hotel Corp.,99 for example, the Delaware Supreme court 
approved a charter provision permitting interested directors to count in a quorum. 
For this court, the contractibility of common law rules was permitted by the 
variation provision; the limits of this contractibility being set by statutory 
enactment or ‘a public policy settled by the common law or implicit in the General 
Corporation Law itself’. ‘Public policy’ acts here as an opaque receptacle into 
which a court can place the corporate legal rules that it deems sufficiently 
important to be non-contractible. Importantly, it was clear in Sterling, as in other 
cases where charter provisions address self-dealing transactions,100 the 
fundamental regulatory protections which Delaware law applies to self-dealing 
                                                     
95 W.H. Corbin, The Act Concerning Corporations in the State of New Jersey (New Jersey: F.D. Linn & Co., 
1892), 8 fn (t). 
96 See Whalen v Hudson 170 N.Y.S. 855 (1918) for an example of the invalidation of a self-dealing opt-out.  
97 34 Del. 81 (1926). 
98 Delaware General Corporation Law (as of 1926), § 5. 
99 33 Del. Ch. 293 (1952). 
100 Helfman v American Light and Traction Company 121 N.J. Eq. 1 (1936). 
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transactions, namely at this time fairness review, cannot be removed through 
charter provision.   
With regard to the directors’ powers and obligations, a closely related strand 
of argument, which curtails the scope for contractual variation of such powers and 
obligations, is the view that the organs of the corporation – the board and the 
shareholder meeting – are the product of state action. and as such, power to vary 
the obligations owed by directors and to relieve directors of liability for breach of 
those obligations cannot be exercised by the shareholder body. Only the state 
acting through the legislature or through the courts can alter the obligations or 
provide relief from liability for breach.  We see this clearly articulated in New York 
Dock Company v McCollum,101 where the Official Referee, in holding that a director 
was not entitled to indemnification for his litigation expenses, observes that the 
director ‘derives his powers and authority neither from the stockholders nor from 
the corporation. His status is sui generis. His office is a creature of the law.’ As such, 
drawing on an earlier New York case involving a municipal corporation, a right to 
indemnification is unavailable because the risk assumed by the director is ‘exactly 
like the risk assumed by an officer of a municipal corporation’ and, citing Matter of 
Chapman v City of New York,102 ‘when a citizen accepts a public office, he assumes 
the risk of defending himself against unfounded accusations at his own expense.’ 
Accordingly, indemnification could only be granted by ‘judicial sanction’ (state 
action) based ‘upon equitable considerations’ (by implication,103 regardless of any 
indemnification provision in the charter).  It follows from this analysis that any 
attempt to provide for indemnification for breach, or indeed waiver of liability for 
breach, requires an enabling provision in the Statute: the state must permit 
indemnification or variation. And indeed, as is well known such legislative 
provisions have represented some of the most important amendments to 
corporate codes over the past century.104 
When we turn to 19th century corporate texts what is striking for a UK 
company lawyer is the absence of serious discussion about the scope for the 
shareholders to vary the governance structure and the obligations of directors 
through contract. Discussions about charter amendment are typically taken up 
with discussions about the scope for the state to amend the charter and the 
conditions which determine the validity of such amendments.105 For US corporate 
legal discourse and corporate lawyers in the 19th century the contractibility of core 
governance rules amounted to a legal non-sequitur. It made no sense within the 
state-based conception of the corporation. As we shall see in Part II of this article, 
                                                     
101 16 N.Y.S. 2d 844 (1939). 
102 168 N.Y. 80. (1901). 
103 By implication because there was no charter amendment in this case.  
104 See amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law allowing corporations to provide for 
director indemnification. See, generally, S. Arsht and W.K. Stapleton, ‘Delaware's New General 
Corporation Law: Substantive Changes’ (1967) 23 Business Law 75, 77-80; and the amendment to the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, § 102(b)(7), providing for duty of care liability waivers, now set forth 
in Del. Code Ann.tit § 102(b)(7) (1986). 
105 See, for example, H.O. Taylor, The Law of Private Corporations (Philadelphia: Kay & Brother, 3rd ed, 
1894), 407-507.  
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both in the case law and the commentary there is significant legal borrowing and 
transplantation from UK case law addressing issues arising from what were in 
many respects for both jurisdictions sui generis legal institutions. However, when 
borrowing the English case law, US law filters out the contractarian mileu of UK 
company law: the substantive legal rules travel; their contractibility does not.   
US commentators have argued that different conceptions of the corporation 
dominated the understanding of the corporate enterprise at different points during 
the 19th century, commencing with a move from a state empowerment entity 
theory, to a partnership based theory of the corporation between the early 1880s 
and the turn of the century, which in turn is replaced by an organic ‘real entity’ 
theory of the corporation.106 Although such conceptual evolution may – and the 
article takes no position on this – have been operable in the public, political and 
constitutional legal debates about the corporation in the 19th century and early 
20th century, it is not a stage theory of the conception of the corporation which 
makes sense of the law’s internal- or self-conception of the corporation which 
maintains a consistent commitment to the state empowerment conception of the 
corporation. One only has to juxtapose the US corporate texts that are said by 
some commentators107 to represent the high-water mark of the 19th century’s 
partnership conception of the US corporation next to Lindley’s Treatise on Company 
Law as a branch of the Law of Partnerships to realise that the central contractual 




II THE FORMATION OF CORPORATE SELF-DEALING LAW 
 
In the 19th century, both in the United States and the United Kingdom, directors 
of corporations were readily viewed as, or at least labelled, trustees of the 
corporation. Like trustees, directors performed a representative function. Indeed 
in many early US general incorporation statutes directors were referred to as 
‘trustees’.108 This analogy to the trustee enabled the transplantation of fiduciary law 
to fill in the gaps left by general incorporation statutes in relation to the 
expectations and duties of directors. 
When any rules are borrowed to address a problem of first impression, across 
subject areas or across jurisdictions, the context and background of the legal 
‘transplantator’ will affect the types of rules that are borrowed, those that are left 
behind, and the ways in which the borrowed rules are interpreted and explored. 
Here we are concerned with a central aspect of the systemically provided 
background of 19th century corporate lawyers: their conception of the corporation 
                                                     
106 Horwitz, n 68 above; Coates, n 74 above. 
107 ibid. 
108 New York Act to Authorize the Formation of Companies for Manufacturing Purposes 1848, § 3. 
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and of corporate power. We ask how do the distinctive conceptual backgrounds of 
UK and US lawyers inform the process of transplanting fiduciary law rules to 
address corporate self-dealing? How did this background inform 19th lawyers’ 
attempts, as well as their perception of the need, to tailor fiduciary law to the 
corporation in a way that was responsive to the instrumental economic needs of 
market participants? 
 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF SELF-DEALING LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
1. Directors as trustees 
19th century English company law naturally looked to trusts law to regulate the 
behaviour of directors of both unincorporated and incorporated companies. 
Directors were viewed as ‘in some sense trustees’.109 As Professor Sealy has 
observed, it is often assumed that the application of trustee duties to directors of 
companies incorporated by registration flowed from the application of trust law 
obligations to deed of settlement companies whose directors literally were trustees, 
because a deed of settlement company was a legal construction made up of trusts 
law and contract. However, Sealy has shown that this is incorrect. In most 
instances the directors of deed of settlement companies, in relation to whom 
corporate law borrowed from trust law, were different individuals than the 
trustees. For Sealy the application of trusts law doctrine to directors of 
unincorporated and incorporated companies alike followed logically from the 
nature of directorial role: quite simply they were trusted by the shareholders to act 
on behalf of the company; entrusted with the management of the company’s 
assets.110  
For the first companies incorporated by registration under the Joint Stock 
Company Act of 1844 it was unnecessary to borrow from trusts law to address 
self-dealing contracts as the Act addressed these transactions directly. Section 29 
of the 1844 Act disabled a conflicted director from acting in relation to such 
transactions and, reflecting the trust law position we shall discuss below, rendered 
such transactions unenforceable without shareholder approval. However, by the 
                                                     
109 Charitable Corporation v Sutton (1742) 2 Atk 400. See Palmer, n 31 above, 147, observing that that ‘it is 
impossible to dispute the proposition that [directors] are in some sense trustees, that proposition having 
been established by a long series of cases’ [emphasis added]. See also Forest of Dean & Co (1879) 10 CD 
450 – see, generally, Palmer, n 31 above, 148. The labelling of directors as trustees took two different 
guises: the first was simply to call them trustees; the second, and clearly more accurate, approach was to 
identify them as trust-like or, in the English context, as quasi-trustees. Courts were aware that the analogy 
was a general one. Consider, for example, Lord Justice Bowen’s dicta in Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Company 
v Hampson (1882) 23 Ch.D. 1: ‘When persons who are directors of a company are from time to time 
spoken of by Judges as agents, trustees, or managing partners of the company, it is essential to recollect 
that such expressions are used not as exhaustive of the powers or responsibilities of those persons, but 
only as indicating useful points of view from which they may for the moment and for the particular 
purpose be considered […] It is not meant that they belong to the category, but that it is useful for the 
purpose of the moment to observe that they fall pro tanto within the principles which govern that 
particular class.’ 
110 In York Rail. Co. v Hudson (1853) 16 Beav. 485, Romillly MR held that ‘the directors are persons 
selected to manage the affairs of the company for the benefit of the shareholders. It is an office of trust 
which, if they undertake, it is their duty to perform fully and entirely’. 
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Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 this provision had disappeared from the Act, 
leaving the regulation of self-dealing transactions to rely on the court’s adaptation 
of fiduciary law to the company.   
For whom the directors of an incorporated company were trustees or had 
trustee-like responsibilities, and to whom they owed their obligations of trust, were 
questions with which English company law struggled somewhat in the 19th 
century. Today UK company lawyers will readily inform you that directors are 
appointed by the company through the shareholders acting in general meeting, and 
it follows that the directors' duties of loyalty and care are owed to the company 
not to the shareholders. But this was less clear to 19th century company law. 
Logically obligations are owed by a ‘trustee’ to the person who empowers you to 
act and to any other person who the person who empowers you to act directs you 
to act on behalf of. In Charitable Corporation v Sutton,111 a case involving a chartered 
corporation, Lord Hardwicke, the Lord Chancellor, put it as follows: 
‘[Directors]112 are most properly agents of those who employ them in this trust, 
and who empower them to direct [and] superintend the affairs of the corporation.’ 
This view was the basis for his conclusion that the ‘foundation’ of the director’s 
‘charge’ ‘was of a mixed nature: It partakes of the nature of a public office, as it 
arises from the charter of the Crown.’  Applying this logic, it would follow that in 
a UK company which is incorporated by registration, as the directors are 
empowered by the shareholder body through the corporate contract, the 
obligation of trust is owed to shareholders, unless the shareholders direct that it is 
owed to someone else. In this regard, Lindley observed: 
 
It is part of the contract into which the members of a company enter, that the 
management of its concern shall be confided to a few chosen individuals. But 
whilst this contract limits the right of each member to interfere in the 
conduct of its affairs […] it, if possible, increases the obligations of the 
directors to observe good faith toward the great body of shareholders to attend 
diligently to their interests and to act within the limits of the authority conferred 
on them. Directors are not only agents, but to a certain extent trustees. Their 
position, however, is very different from ordinary trustees, whose primary 
duty is to preserve the trust property and not to risk it. Directors have to 
carry on business and this necessarily involves risk. The duty of  directors to 
shareholders is so to conduct the business of the company, as to obtain for 
the benefit of the shareholders the greatest advantages that can be obtained 
consistently with the trust reposed in them by the shareholders and with honesty to 
other people; and although it is true that the directors have more power, both 
for good and for evil, than is possessed by the shareholders individually, still 
that power is limited and accompanied by at trust, and is to be exercised bona 
                                                     
111 n 109 above. 
112 The case deals with the ‘committee men’ of the company. 
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fide for the purposes for which it was given, and in the manner contemplated by those 
who gave it [Emphasis supplied].113 
 
For Lindley the obligation or expectation of ‘trust’ imposed on directors arises as a 
result of the shareholders empowering the directors to act on their behalf. Note 
also the very personal nature of the transfer of power from the shareholders, not 
to the company or to the ‘board’ but to ‘a few chosen individuals’. The company 
as an entity is not present in this discussion of director power. The bilateral 
relationship between trustee and beneficiary was thereby easily grafted on to the 
director and the shareholder.   
An early and important example of borrowing from trust law was the self-
dealing case of Aberdeen Railway Company v Blaikie, a case which is also of 
considerable importance in 19th century US corporate law. In Aberdeen Railway v 
Blaikie, the Aberdeen Railway Company, a chartered not a registered company,114 
purchased railway chairs for train tracks from a partnership called Blaikie Brothers. 
Mr Blaikie, one of the partners in Blaikie Brothers, was also a director and 
chairman in the company.  The company repudiated the contract claiming that the 
self-dealing nature of the contract rendered it unenforceable. The House of Lords 
agreed, holding that the contract was unenforceable regardless of whether or not it 
was fair to the company. Lord Cranworth, the Lord Chancellor held that: 
 
It is a rule of universal application that no one having such duties to 
discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can 
have a personal interest conflicting or which possibly may conflict with the 
interests of those whom he is bound to protect. So strictly is this principle 
adhered to that no question is allowed to be raised as to the fairness or 
unfairness of a contract so entered into. It obviously is, or may be, impossible 
to demonstrate how far in any particular case the terms of such a contract 
have been the best for the cestui que trust which it was impossible to obtain. 
It may sometimes happen that the terms on which a trustee has dealt or 
attempted to deal with the estate or interests of those for whom he is a 
trustee have been as good as could have been obtained from any other 
person; they may even at the time have been better. But still so inflexible is 
the rule that no inquiry on that subject is permitted […] 
 
                                                     
113 Lindley, n 27 above, 364. 
114 In this context, although commentators noted the important conceptual differences between chartered 
and registered companies (see text to nn 30-32 above), the limited number of chartered commercial 
companies came to be treated by 19th century courts within the same partnership / contractual paradigm 
as registered companies. This is unsurprising given that the constitution of charted companies was set 
forth in the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, an act heavily influenced by prevailing 
arrangements in deed of settlement companies, and which in turn operated as a prototype for the model 
Table A Articles.  
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The English authorities on this subject are numerous and uniform [...]115The 
inability to contract depends not on the subject-matter of the agreement, but 
on the fiduciary character of the contracting party. 
 
In Aberdeen Railway there are two distinct legal considerations invoked by self-
dealing transactions. The first is the duty of loyalty – to avoid putting oneself in a 
position where duty to the company and personal interest conflict or possibly 
conflict – an obligation that would be breached only by the self-dealing director.  
The second is a restriction on the directors’ authority to manage the company, 
applicable to the authority of all directors: the powers delegated to directors are 
limited by the fiduciary relationship and cannot be deployed to enter into a self-
dealing contract. Lord Cranworth refers to the ‘inability to contract’. Counsel for 
the partnership argued that even though Mr Blaikie was conflicted and participated 
in the decision to enter into the contract he was but one of several directors who 
were not conflicted and therefore the contract should be enforceable. Lord 
Cranworth rejected this claim through the lens of duty holding that ‘it was Mr 
Blaikie’s duty to give to his co-directors, and through them to the company, the 
full benefit of all the knowledge and skill which he could bring to bear on the 
subject’.116 He could, in the alternative, have held that the directors were not 
authorised to enter into such a transaction given the ‘fiduciary character of the 
contracting party’.117  
The judgment reads as an absolute prohibition on self-dealing. However, it 
was clear from the trusts authorities relied upon by the court that the informed 
consent of the cestui que trust, and by analogy the shareholders, could authorise a 
self-dealing transaction or validate a voidable agreement.118 These self-dealing trust 
authorities are based upon a contractual theory of authority that views the strict 
standard as a default rule. The trustees have no authority to enter into a self-
dealing transaction unless such authority is explicitly provided by the settler or the 
beneficiaries.119 That is, the general grant of authority to exercise trust powers is 
                                                     
115 Citing: Keech v Sandford Sel. Cas. Ch. 61 (1726); Whelpdale v Cookson 1 Ves. Sen. 9 (1741); and noting 
that ‘the whole subject was considered by Lord Eldon on a great variety of occasions. It is sufficient to 
refer to what fell from that very able and learned judge in Ex parte James Ves. 337 (1803)’.  
116 A detailed discussion of the relationship between this holding and the understanding of director power 
in an English company is deferred to the section on the evolution of New York self-dealing law. See text 
to nn 208-214 below. 
117 More recently, Millett LJ in Ingram v IRC [1997] 4 ALL ER 395, 426 observed that ‘a trustee's power of 
sale does not authorise the trustee to sell the trust property except to someone with whom he can deal at 
arm's length’. 
118 See Ex parte Lacey 6 Ves. 625 (1802); Ex parte James, n 115 above. 
119 See Ex parte James 8 Ves. Jun. 338 (1802), where Lord Eldon LC observed that ‘the rule is that a 
trustee shall not become a purchaser, until he enters into a fair contract that he may become a purchaser, 
with those interested […] It is a question therefore of prudence […] whether [the beneficiaries] will 
permit him to buy’; Downes v Grazebrook [1814-23] All ER Rep 300, per Lord Eldon LC: ‘he continues to 
be a trustee he cannot, without the express authority of his cestui que trust, have anything to do with the trust 
property as a purchaser. In order to make the sale in the present case a valid transaction, it is, therefore, 
incumbent on Mr Grazebrook to show that he had such an authority to enable him to become a purchaser at that 
sale’ (emphasis supplied). 
  
David Kershaw                                         The Path of Fiduciary Law   
 
 29 
qualified and does not extend to self-dealing transactions. In Benson v Heathorn, an 
1838 self-dealing case involving an unincorporated company, the court put it as 
follows:  
 
I apprehend that, without any special provision for the purpose, it was by law an 
implied and inherent term in the engagement [of the directors] that they 
should not make any other profit to themselves of that trust or employment, 
and should not acquire to themselves, while they remained directors, an 
interest adverse to their duty (emphasis supplied).120 
 
2. Contracting out of fiduciary rules 
Companies aware of the potential benefits of entering into self-dealing contracts 
that were fair to the company, yet also aware of the pitfalls and administrative 
burdens involved in obtaining shareholder approval for those contracts, 
responded to the application of these strict rules of equity to companies by 
contractually amending their application. Typically, companies in their articles of 
association adopted a variant of the standard constitutional terms imposed on 
chartered companies which provided that a director’s office would be vacated if he 
became directly or indirectly interested in the contract.121 The contractual variant 
provided that the office would only be vacated if the director failed to disclose the 
contract. By implication such disclosed contracts were enforceable, and the self-
dealing directors were not liable to account for any profits they made from the 
transaction. The question for the courts was therefore whether the demanding 
obligation of loyalty and the restrictions on authority set forth in Aberdeen Railway 
could be contractually varied. As is clear from the above analysis the view that 
they could be varied is wholly consistent with the contractual conception of an 
English company as well as, more specifically, with the contractual theory of 
authority which underpins both director and trustee power. 
In the leading case of Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman,122 a 
director of the plaintiff company purchased debentures at a five per cent discount 
and sold them to the company at a one and a half per cent discount. The default 
by the issuer of the debentures resulted in the collapse of the company. The 
liquidator sued the directors to account for profits made from the self-dealing 
contract. However, the company had a provision in the articles similar to the 
constitutional amendment described above. In reaching his conclusion that the 
director was not required to account for the profits, Lord Hatherley LC sitting in 
the Court of Appeal was clearly cognisant of the economic policy considerations 
that support making the rules on self-dealing contracts less restrictive: 
 
The principle [set forth in Aberdeen Railway] is so firmly established that I 
should be extremely sorry to say anything which would in the slightest decree 
                                                     
120 1 Y. & C.C.C. 325 (1842). 
121 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, § 86. 
122 L.R. 6 Ch. App. 588 (1871). 
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impeach it […] However, the question then remains, whether the company 
cannot stipulate that this is a benefit of which they do not desire to avail 
themselves, and if they are competent so to stipulate, whether they may not 
think that in large financial matters of this description it is better to have 
directors who may advance the interests of the company by their connection, 
and by the part which they themselves take in large money dealings, than to 
have persons who would have no share in such transactions as those in which 
the company is concerned.123 
 
Lord Hatherley held that the provision in the articles amounted to an enforceable 
contractual variation of the equitable rule and, as the director had disclosed his 
interest, he was entitled to keep the profit.124 His deference to a contractual 
conception of the corporation is explicit and forthright. Following on from the 
above quotation he observes: 
 
It is not for me to say which was the wiser or better course of the two, nor do 
I think that this Court professes to lay down rules for the guidance of men 
who are adult, and can manage and deal with their own interests. It would be 
a violent assumption if anything of that kind were attempted. It must be left 
to such persons to form their own contracts and engagements, and this Court 
has only to sit here and construe them, and also to lay down certain general 
rules for the protection of persons who may not have been aware of what the 
consequences would be of entrusting their property to the management of 
others where nothing is expressed as to the implied arrangement. 
 
By viewing the strict fiduciary rules as default rules that could be amended by the 
corporate contract the instrumental economic need to facilitate contracts between 
corporations and directors is addressed while leaving the strict standard in place in 
its purity, untouched by that instrumental economic pressure. Indeed it was clear 
that the type of contractual variation set forth in Imperial Mercantile – disclosure and 
disinterested director approval – was just one example of the ways that the 
shareholder body could address self-dealing contracts. They could, quite 
legitimately, have simply said that the board had authority to enter into such 
contracts and such contracts would then have been enforceable without 
disclosure.125 This combination of trust law’s fiduciary standards and contractual 
                                                     
123 Counsel for the defendant director submitted that ‘this company, like other similar companies, chose 
directors who could bring them business, and the company were willing, for the sake of getting that 
business, to waive the ordinary rules as to directors’. 
124 Note that the House of Lords (LR 6 HL 189) reversed the Court of Appeal, but only on the basis that 
the director’s disclosure was insufficient to comply with the provision in the articles. It did not challenge 
Lord Hatherley’s conclusion that contractual variation was permissible.  
125 Writing in 1902 Palmer, n 31 above, 159, observes that ‘these are the rules prima facia applicable to 
such transactions, but a company is at liberty to waive the benefit of those rules, and to allow a director 
to make a contract, or to be interested in a contract, with the company and regulations [the articles] very 
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variation left the courts on the side lines with no role to play apart from 
determining whether there had been compliance with the stipulation in the articles. 
There was no need for the courts to explore whether fiduciary law could provide a 
more flexible standard, as companies and shareholders were empowered to 
provide flexibility themselves. 
 
3. Detaching contractibility 
Until 1980 UK company law’s self-dealing landscape could be accurately and 
comprehensively summarised by reference to Aberdeen Railway and Imperial 
Mercantile. However, although the contractual underpinnings of both the company 
and fiduciary law provided a swift and simple response to the instrumental 
economic need for directors to do business with the company, in the long run this 
resulted in arguably sub-optimal regulation of self-dealing transactions in the UK. 
The recurring regulatory diagnosis in the UK in relation to directors’ duties, 
typically brought into focus by a corporate crisis or scandal, has been: (i)  that 
company law, formed prior to the separation of ownership and control, assumes 
that shareholders are active participants in the corporate contract when in reality 
due to collective action problems and rational apathy they are not; (ii) shareholders 
need to be protected from the power imbalance created by these collective action 
problems which managers can exploit by facilitating their company’s opt-out of 
the strict legal standards that hold managers to account; and (iii) it follows 
therefore that the existing substantive rule should be made a mandatory rule. That 
is, the UK’s repeat regulatory move in response to crisis has been to remove 
contractibility.126 But it has typically done so without any awareness that the 
substantive legal rules, which are then rendered mandatory, have been formed in 
the context of contractibility and may have been otherwise but for contractibility.  
This is the lesson which we shall see that the United States provides for the United 
Kingdom.  
Today, UK company law’s self-dealing regulation requires shareholder 
approval where the transaction value is the lower of £100,000 or 10 per cent of 
the company’s value.127 Such transactions are known as ‘substantial property 
transactions’. These rules, introduced in 1980 following a corporate scandal,128 are 
mandatory rules. All shareholders, including interested shareholders, can vote. 
However, if the company is listed on the London Stock Exchange then in relation 
to non-de minimis transactions (0.25 per cent of the company’s capitalisation) it is 
subject to the additional regulation set forth in the United Kingdom Listing 
Authority’s Listing Rules,129 which require a disinterested shareholder vote.130  
                                                                                                                                       
commonly make provision accordingly’. See also Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied 
Technicians [1963] 2 QB 606. 
126 Consider, for example, the duty of care and liability waivers. See text to nn 61-63 above. 
127 Companies Act 2006, § 190-195. 
128 See ‘Substantial Fraud Alleged at L&C’ (30 January 1976) The Times, 23. 
129 United Kingdom Listing Authority, Listing Rule 10. Until October 2009 these rules were mandatory 
for UK companies. Since 2009 UK companies may elect for a ‘standard listing’ in contrast to a ‘Premium 
Listing’ to which such rules do not apply. Most UK listing companies have a premium listing.   
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This article’s central submission is that in order to understand the path of 
self-dealing law in the UK and the US closer attention needs to be played to the 
legal drivers of adaption of fiduciary law to commercial concerns. Clearly, as the 
cases evidence, in both jurisdictions adaption took place in a context where 
lawmakers were aware of, or irritated by, instrumental economic pressures. It may 
be the case that the benign aspects of such pressures were over-weighted and that 
such pressures really represented managerial rent-seeking. However, if such 
justifications for taking into account these needs and interests are at all benign 
then the UK’s decision to keep the standard while removing its twin of 
contractibility is cause for concern.  The US’s experience, particular the trajectory 
of New Jersey law addressed below, suggests that the UK self-dealing standard 
would have been different but for such contractibility.   
 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF SELF-DEALING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Writing in 1960, Harold Marsh in his seminal article, ‘Are Directors’ Trustees’,131 
articulated a compelling three-stage narrative about the evolution of self-dealing 
law in the United States. He showed how in the first stage in the wake of the 
introduction of general incorporation, self-dealing law rendered any self-dealing 
transaction voidable by the corporation or any shareholder without regard to the 
actual fairness of the transaction. Commentators in 1880, he observes, would have 
been able ‘with confidence’ to have stated that this was the general rule. By 1910, 
however, the rule had changed to provide that self-dealing transactions were 
enforceable if fair and approved by disinterested directors. By 1960, according to 
Marsh, the disinterested director approval requirement had dropped away, and it 
could be said, as it could be said today:  
 
With some assurance that that the general rule was that no transaction of a 
corporation with any or all of its directors was automatically voidable at the 
suit of a shareholder whether there was a disinterested majority of the board 
or not, but that the courts would review such a contract and subject it to rigid 
and careful scrutiny, and would invalidate the contract if it was found to be 
unfair to the corporation.132  
 
Marsh argues that the transition from voidability to disinterested director approval 
plus fairness and then to fairness alone, is unexplained in policy terms by the 
                                                                                                                                       
130 For transactions below the substantial property transactions threshold, or for listed companies that are 
de-minimis, the contemporary regime requires disclosure in order to be able to keep the benefit of the 
transaction without obtaining shareholder approval, but in keeping the UK company law’s underlying 
bias in favour of contractibility, it leaves it open to companies to craft other regulatory solutions –
Companies Act 2006, § 177. 
131 Marsh, n 15 above. 
132 ibid, 43. 
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cases. The first transition, he submits, takes place without any attempt to address 
the strong policy factors articulated in the circa 1880 cases to the effect that if a 
director is placed in a position in which personal interest is in conflict with 
corporate interest, then ‘in the majority of cases duty would be overborne in the 
struggle’.133 Marsh argues that ‘one searches in vain in the decided cases for a 
reasoned defence of this change in legal philosophy, or for the slightest attempts 
to refute the powerful arguments which had been made in favour of the previous 
rule’. 
Although Marsh’s view of the evolution of self-dealing regulation is widely 
accepted in the US corporate legal debate, it is not correct.134  This article is not 
the first to suggest this. In important articles in the 1990s,135 Professor Beveridge 
argued that Marsh’s account was incorrect and that fairness considerations were 
central to US self-dealing law much earlier that Marsh had identified. However, his 
views have failed to generate significant traction in the academy and have been 
either rejected,136 relegated to a qualifying footnote to Marsh’s established 
position,137 or forgotten.138 The case made by Beveridge is in essence correct but 
not sufficiently compelling to dislodge the considerable disciplinary investment in 
                                                     
133 Wardell v Union Pacific R.R. Co. 103 U.S. 651 (1880). 
134 Clark, n 16 above, 160-166. See all the articles cited in nn 137 and 138 below, which adopt Marsh’s 
view.  These articles represent only a fraction of the articles that adopt Marsh’s view. 
135 N.P. Beveridge, Jr, ‘The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-
Interested Director Transaction’ (1992) 41 Depaul Law Review 655, and ‘Interested Director Contracts at 
Common Law: Validation Under the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud’ (1999) 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 97. 
136 There is minimal direct assessment of Professor Beveridge’s claim. Those that consider it in more 
depth have rejected it. In W.L. Cary and M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations (New York: 
Foundation Press, 7th ed, 1995), the claim is considered and rejected. 650-651. In the 8th edition there is 
no consideration of Beveridge’s position. See also V. Brudney, ‘Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate 
Law’ (1997) 38 Bclr 595, adopting Marsh’s view, but citing Beveridge and noting that ‘[w]hether or not 
that implementation was as extensively invoked in restraining corporate management and controllers as 
Marsh suggested, there is no doubt that it was pervasive, particularly in industrial states’; and P. Mcginty, 
‘The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic 
Proceduralism’ (1997) 46 Emory Law Journal 163. 
137 C.R. Taylor, ‘The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why Corporate Managers Have Little Fear 
and What Might be Done about It’ (2006) 85 Or. L. Rev. 993, viewing Marsh’s position as ‘widely 
accepted’ although, citing Beveridge, ‘not free from doubt’; J.H. Langbein, ‘Questioning The Trust Duty 
of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest’ (2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 929, 958-959; J. Velasco, ‘Structural 
Bias and the Need for Substantive Review’ (2004) 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 821, 836; R.M. Jones, ‘Rethinking 
Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform’ (2004) 29 Journal of Corporation Law 625, 648; 
Solomon v Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1115 n.48 (del. Ch.1999), noting that ‘Marsh's characterization is 
most likely still viable’. 
138 L.E. Strine, et al, ‘Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law’ 
(2010) 98 Geo. L.J. 629; D.M. Ibrahim, ‘Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?’ (2008) 
93 Iowa L. Rev. 929; E.W. Hecker, Jr, ‘Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities’ (2006) 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 975; 
D.A. Skeel, ‘Icarus and American Corporate Regulation’ (2005) 61 Bus. Law. 155; D.W. Deal, ‘Director’s 
Vulnerability to Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims for Compensation Decisions: Where Have We Been, 
Where Are We Now?’ (2005) 30  Okla. City U. L. Rec. 311, 321-322; J.G. Hill, ‘Regulatory Responses to 
Global Corporate Scandals’ (available on <www.ssrn.com>); Cunningham, n 11 above, citing Marsh for 
the observation that the fiduciary ‘sealant decayed during the twentieth century’; J.C. Coffee, ‘Gatekeeper 
Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms’ (2004) 84 B. U. L. Rev. 301, 334; 
J.C. Coffee, Jr, ‘The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control’ (2001) 111 Yale L. J. 1;  Cox,  n 17 above, 1079; E. Rock and M. Wachter, 
‘Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants’ (2002) 96 NW. U. 
L. Rev. 651, 668; Solomon v Armstrong, n 137 above. 
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Marsh’s position, which fits perfectly with both the contemporary article of faith 
that fiduciary standards have progressively declined since the introduction of 
general incorporation,139 as well as with the dominant and compelling narrative 
that charter competition drives managerial friendly solutions in areas of corporate 
law that have the potential to be significantly redistributive to managers.   
The starting point for the key 19th century US jurisdictions was in many 
respects identical to that of the United Kingdom. Directors of companies were 
viewed as trustees and indeed were often referred to as ‘trustees’ in general 
incorporation statutes.140 Early 19th century cases in the Supreme Court and in 
individual state courts readily relied upon this analogy, in some instances relying 
on the English chartered corporation case of Charitable Corporation v Sutton.141   
This analogy naturally led to the application and translation of fiduciary law 
principles addressing relationships between trustee, trust, and beneficiary. Indeed, 
in many of the early corporate self-dealing cases we see the application of the same 
English trust cases, as well as US state trust cases that were directly based upon 
such cases, that formed the bedrock of the UK’s self-dealing law analysed above. 
We also see direct reliance on some of the key UK cases which translated English 
trust law principles into the company context, in particular Aberdeen Railway v 
Blaikie.142 This initial step in US regulation of self-dealing appears wholly 
consistent with the first stage of Marsh’s account of the development of this area 
of the law: there was indeed a strong strand of authority established in the 1860 
and 1870s and affirmed in multiple cases thereafter – in some jurisdictions until as 
late as the 1940s – articulating a position which was, or at least can be read as 
being, effectively identical to the position taken in Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie.  
Fairness review is presented by Marsh as an unexplained legal change of 
direction from the morally upstanding starting point of the voidability standard.    
This section argues that this view is based upon a partial view of the English and 
US fiduciary law authorities that were available for borrowing to regulate director 
conduct. In fact, US corporate law sampled more broadly from the English 
fiduciary law pool than did UK corporate jurisprudence and in doing so created 
multiple paths towards fairness review. In two respects 18th and 19th century 
non-corporate fiduciary doctrine contained a fairness based approach to self-
dealing contracts. The first approach involved what this article shall call remedial 
fairness. Where contracts have been performed and it is no longer possible to 
unravel the contract, the law must unpick the transaction to determine the remedy 
that the trustee or the corporation should receive. In such circumstances the 
                                                     
139 See n 11 above. 
140 See n 108 above. 
141 n 107 above. 
142 Benson v Heathorn, n 120 above, is also referred to in several cases, for example: Wardell v Union Pac. R. 
Co 103 US 651 (1880); Hoffman Steel Coal Co. v Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. 16 Md. 456 (1960); Cumberland 
Coal & Iron Co. v Parish 42 Md. 598 (1875); Hoyle v Plattsburgh & M.R. Co. 9 Sickels 314 (1873); Globe 
Wollen Co. v Utica Gas & Electric Co. 151 A.D. 184. 
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equitable remedy would be an accounting for profits. But what amounts to a 
profit? If a widget is sold by the director to the corporation, is profit anything in 
excess of cost or anything in excess of a market return? If it is a service that has 
been consumed by the corporation, is profit anything paid to the director or 
anything in excess of a market price for the service? If law’s answer is ‘market 
return’, then a strict rule of voidability becomes a fairness standard in relation to 
executed contracts.  
The second channel to fairness review contained within fiduciary law is 
dependent on how trust, trustee, and beneficiary are translated into the corporate 
context of corporation, board, director, and shareholder. As we have seen in the 
UK context, and will see again below, corporate law borrowed from trust law’s 
approach to self-dealing which provides for the voidability of such transactions 
regardless of their fairness (subject to the remedial fairness approach noted 
above). Through this lens the board of directors are the trustees, and entering in a 
transaction with the corporation is analogous to entering into a transaction with 
the trust. However, the corporation does not fit perfectly with the trust analogy. 
The corporation (through the shareholder meeting) appoints the directors, and the 
directors act on behalf of the corporation not the shareholders.  A transaction 
between the director and the corporation could also therefore be analogised to a 
transaction between a trustee (in his personal capacity) and the beneficiary, or a 
transaction between an agent and his principal or between an attorney and his 
client, with the corporation as the active beneficiary or client. As the corporation is 
incapable of acting for itself (without the assistance of the board), this analogy 
would require the director to play no role in the board’s decision to enter into the 
contract. Transactions between trustees and beneficiaries or between attorney and 
client were treated warily by English and US courts in the 18th and 19th century; 
however, they did not attract the strict voidability rule that was applicable to a self-
dealing transactions between trust and trustee;  rather they were subject to 
fairness-like (both fair process and fair price)  regulation. The concern about 
conflict in this context was less acute: the trustee or beneficiary was not acting on 
both sides of the transaction although he was well placed to exert undue and 
inappropriate influence on the transaction. Accordingly, a different fiduciary 
analogy would open the door to fiduciary law’s existing fairness approach.  
This section will demonstrate that the story of fairness and strictness in US 
self-dealing regulation is not about one being replaced by the other in the 19th 
century – the chronological acceptance of fairness coupled with the silent rejection 
of policy position underpinning the strict rule. Rather the story of fairness and 
strictness in 19th century US corporate law, in the 1880s and before, is the story of 
their mutual presence. The interesting question therefore is not, as is suggested by 
Marsh: where did fairness review come from, and how did it come to replace the 
strict voidability rule? It was there and available at the inception of US corporate 
law’s regulation of self-dealing when it elected to borrow from other fiduciary 
contexts. The interesting question is rather: what was it about US corporate law 
that enabled its development in, as we shall see below, a very short time frame, 
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whereas in the UK, where in theory it was equally available, it was not developed at all? 
In this section it is argued that the conception of the US corporation and its 
understanding of corporate power opened the door to fiduciary law borrowing 
more widely than the UK conception of the company allowed for; and where the 
path of fiduciary law’s fairness standard was not taken by state courts, the 
limitations on contractibility for the US corporation drove litigants and courts to 
explore remedial fairness in a way that was unnecessary in the United Kingdom.   
To consider this argument in more depth this section will consider the 
development of the law in the 19th century’s most important US corporate law 
jurisdictions: New Jersey and New York. We will then turn to Delaware. 
Nineteenth and early twentieth century commentaries on corporate law devote 
significant attention to self-dealing. They typically do so, however, with limited 
regard to the jurisdictional specificity of each state’s corporate law.143 This is also 
characteristic of responses to Beveridge’s critique of Marsh.144 However, 19th 
century US corporate law is characterised by a strong sense of jurisdictional 
specificity. This jurisdictional specificity generates different paths of legal 
evolution and in the self-dealing context different paths towards fairness review. 
In this context, taking a ‘US corporate law’ viewpoint has the effect of 
exacerbating an already highly complex body of law, generating a sense of legal 
chaos and indeterminacy when in fact within the key jurisdictions the complexity 
is far less chaotic and the law far more path-dependent than commentators have 
acknowledged.    
 
1. New Jersey 
a. The remedial implications of a strict standard 
Writing in 1861,145 Angell and Ames observed that ‘though the member of the 
corporation be also one of the trustees of the corporation, it would seem that this 
would not incapacitate him from contracting with it but he may recover against 
the corporation for his services rendered under a contract with the other trustees, 
in a case where there is no evidence of such gross impartiality in the contract as 
amounts to fraud’. In this statement two of the three regulatory strategies 
deployed in self-dealing law in the United States can be identified: first, self-
dealing contracts are valid and enforceable provided that the self-dealing director 
does not act for the company in entering into the contract – the contract must be 
made ‘with the other trustees’; and second, the contract must be fair to the 
corporation to be enforceable – articulated through the more demanding language 
of ‘gross impartiality’ and ‘fraud’. Angell and Ames cite three Vermont cases in 
support of this proposition, two of which dealt with religious corporations 
                                                     
143 See Thompson, n 44 above.  
144 See Cary and Eisenberg, n 136 above, 651, referring to cases from Alabama, California, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, New York, and Maryland in response to Beveridge. 
145  Angell and Ames, n 65 above, 200. 
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incorporated to build meeting houses, the third with a school district.146 The early 
New Jersey Chancery case of Stratton v Allen147 relies directly on this passage in 
Angell & Ames in holding that:  
 
The mere fact that the creditor was a director of the company, does not 
render the transaction fraudulent. There is nothing which forbids either the 
members or directors of a corporation to make contracts with it, like any 
other individual; and when the contract is made, the director stands, as to the 
contract, in the relation of a stranger to the corporation.   
 
Stratton v Allen suggests, contrary to Marsh’s view, that a disinterested director and 
fairness standard was established long before the 20th century. Professor 
Beveridge in his critique of Marsh’s claim relies upon Angell and Ames’s position 
and the cases to which they refer.148 In fact this approach found limited traction in 
the development of New Jersey corporate law with a very limited number of later 
cases that relied on this aspect of the case. Although it was affirmed in the 1878 
case of Franklin Fire Insurance Company v Martin149 by the New Jersey Court of 
Errors and Appeals and, also in 1879, was relied upon at first instance in the 
important case of Gardner v Butler,150 its influence assessed in terms of citations 
disappeared thereafter.  
The real story of New Jersey self-dealing regulation does not start with Angell 
& Ames and Stratton v Allen but with the case of Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co.,151 an 
important case relied on by Harold Marsh to demonstrate the state of the law in 
first of his three stages.  In this 1875 case, which considered a challenged self-
dealing transaction involving a director of a state-chartered canal company, the 
Court of Errors and Appeals viewed the board as trustees for the company and 
directly imported into New Jersey law English corporate and trusts law principles 
governing self-dealing transactions. In a familiar passage the court held as follows: 
 
The position thus assumed by the plaintiff rests upon the broad principle that 
[...] so insidious are the promptings of selfishness and so great is the danger, 
that it will over-ride duty when brought into conflict with it, that sound policy 
requires that such contracts should not be enforced or regarded [...] I have 
come to the conviction that the true legal rule is, that such a contract is not 
                                                     
146  Geer v 10th School District in Richmond 6 Vt. 76 (1834) (applying a good faith standard); Sawyer v 
Methodist Episcopal Society in Royalton 18 Vt. 405 (1846) (affirming Geer); Rogers v Universalist Society 19 Vt. 
187 (1847) (whilst upholding the contract observing that ‘[p]artiality, in any given case, so gross as to 
amount to fraud, will, when sustained, necessarily defeat the contract’. 
147 16 N.J Eq. 229 (1863). 
148  Beveridge, Jr, ‘The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested 
Director Transaction’, n 135 above, 660-661, and ‘Interested Director Contracts at Common Law: 
Validation under the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud’, n 135 above. 
149 40 N.J.L. 568 (1878).  
150 The case is also cited in the Court of Errors and Appeal's judgment in Gardner v Butler 30 N.J. Eq. 702 
(1879). 
151 38 N.J.L. 505 (1875). 
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void, but voidable, to be avoided at the option of the cestui que trust, exercised 
within a reasonable time. I can see no further safe modification or relaxation 
of the principle than this. A director of a corporation may have rights not 
arising out of express contract – such as the right [...] to have money which 
he has loaned it repaid to him; but where the right is one which must stand, if 
at all, upon an express contract, and which does not arise by operation or 
implication of law, then he shall not hold it against the will of his cestui que 
trust; for in the very bargain which gave rise to it, in which he should have 
kept in view the interest of that cestui que trust, there intervened before his eyes 
the opposing interest of himself. The vice which inheres in the judgment of a 
judge in his own cause, contaminates the contract; the mind of the director or 
trustee is the forum in which he and his cestui que trust are urging their rival 
claims, and when his opposing litigant appeals from the judgment there 
pronounced, that judgment must fall. It matters not that the contract seems a 
fair one. Fraud is too cunning and evasive for courts to establish a rule that 
invites its presence. 
 
The claim made by the defendant that the conflict was dissolved if the interested 
director abstains from the decision was rejected by the court.   
 
Nor is it proper for one of a board of directors to support his contract with 
his company, upon the ground that he abstained from participating as 
director in the negotiations for and final adoption of the bargain by his co-
directors, the very words in which he asserts his right declare his wrong; he 
ought to have participated. 
 
The court cites the leading English self-dealing case of Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie 
and the New York corporate law cases of Butts v Wood152 and Gardener v Ogden,153 
which both rely upon Aberdeen Railway, and the trust authorities upon which 
Aberdeen Railway rests.154 The court also cites the influential 1816 New York trust 
case Davoue v Fanning which imported the same line of English trusts cases into 
New York trusts law.155 Indeed the structure of the judgment is almost identical to 
                                                     
152 10 Tiffany 317 (1867). 
153 22 N.Y. 337 (1860). 
154 The English trusts cases relied upon in Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie, n 14 above, and directly in Butts v 
Wood, n 152 above, and Gardner v Ogden, include Keech v Sanford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, and Whelpdale v 
Cookson (1747) 1 Ves Sen 9. 
155 2 Johns.Ch. 252 (1816). The New York Chancery Court in Davoue v Fanning, 2 Johns.Ch. 252 (1816), 
laid particular emphasis on the House of Lords case, York Buildings Co. v Mackensie (1795) 8 Bro Parl Cas 
42, a case dealing with an insolvent chartered company which is also cited in Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co., n 
151 above. The court in Davoue’s summary of the judgment in York Buildings bears a close resemblance 
to the language deployed in Stewart v Lehigh, for example: ‘That he who is intrusted with the interest of 
others, cannot be allowed to make the business an object to himself, because, from the frailty of nature, 
one who has power will be too readily seized with the inclination to serve his own interest at the expense 
of those for whom he is intrusted.’ 
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Aberdeen Railway: a focus on conflicts, a rejection of fairness, and a rejection of 
board composition as a means of mitigating the conflict because as a director you 
are required to serve and not abstain.  
Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co. served as a leading reference point for New Jersey 
self-dealing law for another 60 years.  For example, in 1920 in Busch v Riddle,156 the 
Court of Errors and Appeals referred to the doctrine set forth in Stewart v Lehigh 
as having been ‘uniformly recognized and repeatedly enforced in this state’. In 
1939, citing Stewart v Lehigh the Court of Errors and Appeals observed that ‘the 
complainant was charged with knowledge of the well established principle of law 
affecting corporations in contracting with their officers, which is that such 
contracts are voidable at the instance of the corporation, its stockholders or 
creditors’.157 
However the strict rule articulated in Stewart v Lehigh is only one part of the 
New Jersey self-dealing story; it represents one of two strands of self-dealing 
jurisprudence that co-reside, and indeed complement each other. Importantly, 
these strands have more or less identical starting points. The second strand of 
jurisprudence commences in 1878 with Gardner v Butler,158 a judgment given three 
years after Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co. It is in this strand of cases that the strains 
generated by the need to facilitate transactions between directors and the company 
without obtaining ex-ante shareholder approval are laid bare, and the seeds of the 
contemporary fairness solution are planted.  
In Gardner v Butler a corporation formed by statutory charter entered into an 
agreement with a partnership in which its managing director and several other 
directors were partners. The effect of the agreement was to outsource the 
company’s paper trading business for a commission of six per cent of gross sales. 
The board resolution entering into the transaction was ‘carried’ by the votes of the 
self-dealing directors with only one disinterested director present. At first instance 
the New Jersey Court of Chancery observed that such ‘arrangements made by 
paper manufacturing companies with their directors are by no means unusual’ and 
upheld the arrangement.159 The validity of the arrangement at first instance was 
                                                     
156 92 N.J. Eq. 265 (1920). See also Voorhees v Nixon 72 N.J. Eq. 791 (1907): ‘It must be regarded as the 
settled policy of the law of this state that express contracts between a corporation and one of its directors 
are voidable at the instance of the corporation.’; General Inv. Co. v American Hide & Leather Co. 97 N.J. Eq. 
214 (1925): ‘[I]t is established in Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., that courts will not inquire whether a 
contract such as this seems a fair one. “Fraud is too cunning and evasive for courts to establish a rule that 
invites its presence.” The same case and the many authorities there cited are also an answer to the 
protestation that the director took no part in the negotiations under attack.’ 
157 Wiencke v Branch-Bridge Realty Corporation 125 N.J. Eq. 135 (1939). 
158 n 150 above. 
159  Judicial awareness of market practice and needs that we see in this case is found more explicitly in 
subsequent cases. Consider for example, Robotham v Prudential Ins. Co. of America 64 N.J. Eq. 673, where 
the Court of Chancery considering the rule in Stewart v Lehigh, n 151 above, in the context of cross 
directorships observes, ‘Theoretical rules have to give way to practical necessities of business […] 
common directors abound, and common directors are better than dummies.’ In Stephany v Marsden  N.J. 
Eq. 90 (1908) the court observes in applying Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co., n 151 above, that: ‘I have 
observed a tendency of recent years, arising largely from the extensive and complex dealings and relations 
of modern trading corporations, to relax this rule; the tendency being, as I have observed it, to inaugurate 
the modified doctrine that such contracts should not be deemed voidable at the mere option of the 
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based on three intersecting rationales: First, following Stratton v Allen that a 
director stands in relation to the company as a stranger when he transacts with the 
company; secondly, that if the rule in Stewart v Lehigh Vally Co. applies the director 
is still entitled to reasonable compensation – a rationale developed in greater depth 
by the Court of Errors and Appeals; and thirdly, as an outcrop of the first and 
second rationales and the instrumental benefits of self-dealing contracts, that 
whilst Stewart v Lehigh may set forth the general rule it is subject to exceptions in 
equity: 
 
When the cestui que trust comes into equity to avoid the contract, even, it is 
reasonable that he should be required to show, as a ground for the action of 
the court, something more adverse to the contract than the mere fact that it 
was made with a director; for if it shall, as in the case in hand, appear, not 
only to be fair and just, but actually more advantageous to the company than 
any which could be made with a stranger, why should it be set aside to the 
detriment of the company? (emphasis supplied) 
 
Justice Van Syckle, giving judgment for the Court of Errors and Appeals, affirmed 
the Chancellor’s holding at first instance and does so in a way that lays a clear 
track from the strict rule in Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co. to fairness review. The Court 
strongly affirms the strict approach in Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co. as ‘well settled 
law’. It then proceeds, following the lead of the Chancellor’s second rationale, to 
explore the remedial implications of the rule: what happens if a director enters into 
a contract to provide services or to sell assets to the company, and the services 
have been provided or the assets consumed. In such circumstances what, if 
anything, is the company entitled to, and what does it mean to require the director 
to account for any profits he has made from the executed voidable transaction? To 
explore this issue the court relies on the facts of Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie as a 
hypothetical. The Court asks what would have happened in Aberdeen Railway if the 
railway’s chairs had been delivered and accepted:  
 
I apprehend it would not have been held, in any court, that the company 
could have retained the property and have refused to pay for it – not the 
contract price, but what it was reasonably worth […] It may be safely asserted 
that no authority can be found which will permit a corporate body to retain 
property conveyed to it by a director, or to receive services which he was not 
bound to render as a director, without paying him a fair equivalent […] The 
same principle must apply, whether it is property conveyed or services rendered to the 
company. The cupidity and avarice of the trustee is guarded against by giving 
the cestui que trust the right to repudiate the contract at all times, where it is 
                                                                                                                                       
corporation, but that the burden should be imposed upon these seeking to enforce or support such a 
contract to clearly establish its fairness.’ 
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executory, and to allow simply a just remuneration, without reference to the 
contract price, where it is executed. The trustee thus derives no advantage 
from his breach of duty, and the company can suffer no detriment from his 
service in their behalf (emphasis supplied).160 
 
Applying this logic the court concluded that: 
 
The case resolves itself, then, into this question: Have the directors, whose 
action is the subject of controversy, retained for their services more than they 
are justly and reasonably entitled to? The burden is on them to show what they 
reasonably deserve to have, and no unjust exaction will be permitted 
(emphasis supplied).161 
 
In reaching this conclusion the court directly applies the holding in Stewart v Lehigh 
Valley Co. that such contracts are voidable without regard to fairness and cannot 
be enforced by the breaching director. However, when the court gets to the 
question of remedies then fairness – understood as it is today as arm’s-length 
contracting – enters through the back door. The effect of the Gardner v Butler 
approach is that for any executed self-dealing transactions the Stewart v Lehigh 
substantive standard is dissolved into a remedial fairness standard: because no one 
will bring an action to invalidate the contract, and where an action is brought the 
court will take no action, unless the terms of the contract are unfair. As the terms 
of the service contract in Gardner were fair, the self-dealing directors were not 
liable to account for any profit. Importantly, as the Court of Errors and Appeals 
observes, this approach applies beyond the compensation / operational services 
context of this case and applies ‘whether it is property conveyed or services 
rendered’. Note also that the court in Gardner makes a distinction between 
executory and non-executory contracts rather than a distinction between, on the 
one hand, executory and executed but rescindable contracts and, on the other, 
executed but non-rescindable contracts.162 Many executed self-dealing transactions 
could in theory could be voided and be unwound. By relying on the executory / 
executed distinction more space was created for a remedial fairness approach as it 
included executed but rescindable transactions.163 
In support of this position the Court of Errors and Appeals in Gardner v 
Butler relies on another English case, Great Luxembourg Railway v Magnay,164 where 
the court held that ‘when it is said that he cannot make any profit by the 
                                                     
160 Abderdeen Railway v Blaikie, n 14 above. 
161 ibid. 
162 As the transaction is voidable according to the strict rule, an executed transaction could, where 
possible be unwound. This would not be possible where the service has been provided, or the product 
consumed or integrated in the company’s activities.  
163 See, for example, Oliver v Rahway Ice. Co. 64 N.J. Eq. 596 (1903), where the court refused to unwind a 
share buy-back from the directors, comparing the shares to the railway chairs in Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie, 
n 14 above, had they been used. 
164 25 Beay. 586 (1858). For more recent engagement with this question see Warman v Dwyer (1995) 128 
ALR 201.  
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transaction, it is not meant that he is not to have the proper value of property 
which is actually taken by the company’. It is of interest in this regard that in the 
United Kingdom this case has not to date been cited for this holding. English 
courts have not explored these remedial issues in the context of corporate self-
dealing transactions, although had they done so the likely outcome, following Great 
Luxembourg Railway, would have been identical. English law did not need to push 
the remedial implications of the strict voidability rule because contracting out 
quickly became standard practice and, as we have seen, was sanctioned by the 
courts as the logical extension of the conception of the corporation based on 
contract. This enabled English law to perform quickly the necessary adjustment to 
the economic reality of widespread unapproved self-dealing – an option, which as 
explained in Part I, and is considered further below, was unavailable in New 
Jersey. 
It is important to stress that while Gardner v Butler lays the first stones on 
New Jersey’s path to fairness review it does so in a way that is wholly consistent 
with Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co.  Indeed in some cases Gardner is, correctly, cited 
alongside Stewart v Lehigh in support of the strict approach.165 The evolution of the 
Gardner v Butler approach toward fairness does not, therefore, require a break with 
or an explicit rejection of the strict approach – which would require what Marsh 
never found, namely, a policy account explaining the shift in approach and the 
rejection of the policy underlying the strict approach. The shift to a substantive 
fairness standard merely requires the recognition that from a liability perspective 
there is no difference between a strict rule coupled with remedial fairness standard 
and a substantive fairness standard.  
Many of the subsequent cases which follow Gardner v Butler addressed 
managerial compensation issues. In this context, some courts quickly left the 
niceties of the relationship between the standard applicable to the transaction and 
the remedial consequences thereof behind and came to state the substantive 
standard applicable to these self-dealing transactions in substantive fairness terms. 
In Fougeray v Cord,166 in 1892 the Court of Chancery observes that ‘the [directors] 
are entitled to what their services are reasonably worth, and no more’. In Davis v 
Davis Co.,167 in 1902 the burden, the Court of Chancery holds, is on the directors 
to show that ‘what they have done merit payment’. Subsequent New Jersey Courts 
applied the Gardner v Butler approach beyond the compensation / services context. 
In Oliver v Rahway Ice. Co., a 1903 case involving a stock repurchase from directors 
of the company, Vice Chancellor Stevens extends the application of the Gardner v 
Butler approach beyond services to property,168 with direct reference to Justice Van 
                                                     
165 See, for example, Hodge v United States Steel Corp. 64 N.J. Eq. 807 (1903); Baumohl v Goldstein 95 N.J. Eq. 
597 (1924). 
166 50 N.J. Eq (1892). 
167 63 N.J. Eq. 572. (1903). 
168 On the view of stock as upon ‘the footing of other property’, see Berger v United States Steel Corporation 
63 N.J. Eq. 809.  
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Syckle’s analysis of Aberdeen Railway considered above. The court held that the 
‘company must pay [for the shares] not the contract price but what at the time of 
the sale it was reasonably worth’.169  In Marr v Marr,170 the Court of Chancery 
explicitly extended the Gardner v Butler approach to loans to the company. 
Consistently with Gardner they observe that any entitlement of a contracting party 
to ‘reasonable compensation’ or for the return of the loan (including one must 
assume reasonable interest) is not based on the self-dealing contract itself but 
arises by operation of law. It is noteworthy with regard to loans that Stewart v 
Lehigh Valley itself suggested such an approach: ‘ [A] director of a corporation may 
have rights not arising out of express contract – such as the right [...] to have 
money which he has loaned it repaid to him.’  In Stephany v Marsden in 1908,171 
although the Court does not cite Gardner v Butler, it applies the identical structure 
of analysis: the affirmation of Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co.172 coupled with a remedial 
fairness standard:  
 
Where property has been conveyed to a corporation by a director of the 
corporation, while the contract under which the conveyance has been made 
may be avoided by the corporation, it will be the duty of a court of equity to 
restore to the party who made the conveyance such property or values as he 
has parted with and as have passed to the corporation. 
 
In Tooker v National Sugar Refining Co. of New Jersey,173 a case involving a contract to 
sell to the corporation stock purchased by a director, the court: first, affirmed the 
holding in Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co. that the conflicted director’s recusal from the 
meeting that resolved to enter into the self-dealing contract did not validate the 
contract; indeed it amounted to a ‘breach of trust’; and second, observed that the 
transaction ‘would also have been voidable under the rule of Gardner v. Butler 
which denies to a director the right to bargain gain with his company for a price in 
excess of the real value of the thing sold’. Tooker is particularly interesting as an 
example of how remedial fairness overreaches to become the substantive standard. 
Pursuant to the Stewart v Lehigh and Gardner v Butler approach the transaction is 
voidable, but if it has been executed then the director is entitled to his fair due for 
the service or the property. Remedial fairness review follows as the courts will not 
unwind an executed transaction.  But in Tooker, applying Gardner v Butler, 
voidability becomes a function of the fairness of the transaction.  
                                                     
169 n 163 above. 
170 72 N.J. Eq. 797 (1907). 
171 75 N.J. Eq. 90 (1908). 
172 The Court in Stephany v Marsden, n 159 above, observes: ‘[T]he general rule, as I have briefly defined it, 
as established by our Court of Appeals, cannot be said to have been in any way relaxed by that court 
since it was there first stated in the case of Stewart v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, 38 N. J. Law, 505, and 
it has since been by that court so repeatedly approved and recognized that I must regard it as a fixed part 
of the jurisprudence of this state.’ 
173 80 N.J. Eq. 305 (1912). 
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Aside from Gardner v Butler, there are other separate, apparently stand-alone, 
early strands of fairness review. Stratton v Allen has already been mentioned. 
Another short strand of case law commenced in 1886 with Wilkinson v Bauerle,174  
which involved the sale of the whole company to a director, which certain 
creditors of the company claimed had deprived them of their right to recover 
amounts owed to them. The Court of Errors and Appeals held that it was for the 
director to bear the burden of proving that he was acting in good faith and that 
‘the sale produced the full value of the property’, and if not the creditors could 
‘compel them to account for the full value of the property’. However, the 
subsequent reception of this case was primarily confined to the question of 
whether directors could divert property to themselves to the detriment of 
creditors and, although a limited number of cases drew upon Wilkinson to support 
a fairness review approach,175 they never developed any head of steam.  The 
starting point for fairness review in New Jersey is clearly Gardner v Butler.   
The fairness approach contained in Gardner v Butler – ten years prior to the 
1889 starting gun for regulatory competition176 – and the coexistence of Stewart v 
Lehigh Valley Co. and Gardner v Butler represent a direct and powerful challenge to 
Marsh’s consensus position. The later cases are arguably also somewhat consistent 
with Marsh’s position as he argues that by 1910 the prevalent approach involved a 
combination of majority disinterested (or non-participating interested director) 
board approval plus fairness review. However, although we clearly see remedial 
fairness in the cases in this period the disinterested director / non-participating 
director condition is a regulatory bystander in New Jersey case law. In Gardner v 
Butler there was majority of interested directors who participated in the board 
decision, and in only a few of the subsequent cases, either before 1910 or 
thereafter, is a majority of disinterested directors identified as a relevant factor, and 
in several of those cases the key issue is less the legitimacy of the transaction and 
more the directors' ability to vote and be counted in the quorum.177 From 1878 to 
1960 New Jersey law is best characterised as involving the consistent application 
of a strict voidability / no fairness substantive standard with a fairness remedial 
standard.  The disinterested director requirement did not disappear in New Jersey 
because it was never there. This is unsurprising. The leading voidability case of 
                                                     
174 41 N.J. Eq. 635 (1886). 
175 See, for example, Barry v Moeller N.J. Eq. 483 (1904); Mitchell v United Box Board & Paper 72 N.J. Eq. 
580 (1907). 
176 n 21 above. 
177 Metropolitan Telephone & Telegraph Co. v Domestic Telegraph & Telephone Co. 44 N.J. Eq. 568 (1888), 
referring to Stock Co. v Railroad Co. 34 Ohio St. 450, and suggesting that two companies with overlapping 
interested directors could enter into a contract where those directors are in the minority, and also holding 
that an interested director is incapable of acting and counting for the board quorum. Subsequent New 
Jersey authority has cited Metropolitan for the latter holding – see, for example, Hill Dredging Corp. v Risley 
18 N.J. 501 (1955); Robotham v Prudential Inc. Co. of America 64 N.J. Eq. 673 (1903) (suggesting less onerous 
rules where the interlocking directors in two companies were in the minority – but also suggesting that 
where a director participates on both sides of the transaction, fairness review is applicable and that the 
role of the director in taking the decision may affect who bore the burden of proving fairness). 
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Stewart v Lehigh explicitly rejected the disinterested board / non-participating 
director approach, and the fairness standard was a remedial standard that was not 
connected to the nature of board approval. We shall see below, by way of contrast, 
that the non-participating director was central to New York self-dealing law which 
involved a very different path to a fairness standard and which was function of the 
interested director’s non-participation.     
New Jersey's contemporary common law fairness position is the product of 
the courts recognising that a strict standard plus a remedial fairness approach are 
the functional equivalent of a fairness standard.  The New Jersey courts, however, 
took a considerable period of time to make this functional connection. It was not 
until 1961 in Abeles v Adams Engineering Co. Inc.178  that the New Jersey Supreme 
court set forth the substantive standard without regard to the presumption of 
voidability: ‘[A] contract between a corporation and one of its directors, made 
without approval of the stockholders, is not enforceable by the director unless it is 
honest, fair and reasonable.’ The cases cited in support of the this statement of the 
law include two 1950s New Jersey cases, Eliasberg v Standard Oil Co.179 and Hill 
Dredging Corp. v Risley.180 Eliasberg and Hill Dredging both operate formally within 
the Gardner v Butler strict substantive rule / remedial fairness approach, but the 
strict rule is set forth as a perfunctory prohibition which if not observed results in 
fairness review.181 Interestingly, Eliasberg relies upon the then recent Delaware 
jurisprudence providing for a substantive fairness standard.182  
Why, one might ask did it take so long to convert the fairness remedial 
standard into the substantive standard? Arguably this is because it amounted 
merely to a functional tidying-up of the case law. Given the reference in Eliasberg 
to the Delaware cases, considered below, it also seems plausible that this move to 
a substantive fairness standard involved convergence to the approach taken by the, 
at this time firmly established, market leader in corporate law. Importantly though, 
if regulatory competition was the driver of this shift to an explicit fairness standard 
in New Jersey it is not, as outlined above, one of substantive consequence.  
  
b. Barriers to contractual solutions 
That the seeds of fairness review are found in the very early cases is unsurprising. 
The courts in the US and the UK were both clearly aware of the instrumental 
                                                     
178 Abeles v Adams Engineering Co. Inc. 35 N.J. 411 (1961).  
179 23 N.J. Super 431 (1952). 
180 n 177 above. 
181 Both Eliasberg v Standard Oil Co., n 179 above, and Hill Dredging Corp. v Risley, n 180 above, rely on U.S. 
Steel Corp. v Hodge 64 N.J. Eq. 90, which clearly affirms Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co., n 151 above. In 
Eliasberg, having stated the voidability rule, the court observes that: ‘Where there is no stockholders’ 
approval of a contract or proposal in which a director has a personal interest, the burden is upon the 
director to completely justify the transaction.’ The court in Hill Dredging cites this statement with 
approval. The court states the strict rule that the transaction cannot be entered into without shareholder 
approval, but if it is entered into without approval then, quoting Eliasberg favourably, and citing Stephany v 
Marsden, n 159 above, ‘The burden is on the director to completely justify the transaction.’  See also 
Daloiso v Peninsula Land Co. 127 A.2.D 885 (1956). 
182 Gottlieb v Heyden Chemical Corp. A.2d 595 (Del.Ch. 1951), paras 5-7; Kerbs v California Eastern Airways, 
Inc. 90 2d 652 (Del. Sup Ct. 1952). 
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economic pressures to facilitate some self-dealing contracts. However, from an 
identical starting point – the application of the English corporate and trusts 
authorities on self-dealing – very different paths to facilitating and regulating self-
dealing contracts in the UK and New Jersey were taken. The UK’s contractual 
conception of the corporation allowed market players to fashion their own remedy 
to the barriers created by the strict voidability rules. The courts in New Jersey 
generated an internal response as the external contractual one deployed in the UK 
was not available. It is noteworthy that although Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie plays 
such a central part in the development of New Jersey self-dealing law, there is no 
reference in New Jersey case law to the leading UK contractibility case of Imperial 
Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman.183  
Although it appears that New Jersey corporations and shareholders may have 
adopted contractual opt-outs from the strict rule in their constitutional 
documents,184 it is unclear at what point in time this practice commenced,185 and 
we need to distinguish their adoption from their effectiveness.186 As discussed in 
Part I of this article, US, and in particular the New Jersey courts, imposed 
significant constraints on contractibility. Prior to 1889 contractual amendment of a 
director's powers and obligations was arguably not available at all; thereafter 
although variation was explicitly permitted by the statute it was closely policed and 
restricted. Such constraints were a function of the view that general incorporation 
was an extension of statutory chartering and that, accordingly: the state created the 
corporation; the charter could be viewed as a legislative act; and contractibility was 
a function of the state permitting contractibility which, where the governance rule 
in question was viewed as important (‘a settled legal principle’), it needed to do so 
explicitly.  Although, as was observed in Part I, we see increasing flexibility in 
relation to contractibility during the course of the 20th century, it seems highly 
unlikely that the earlier cases would have been receptive to contracting out of the 
voidability principle which was clearly viewed as a ‘settled legal principle’187 well 
                                                     
183 L.R. 6 Ch. App. 58 (1871). In no state is Imperial Mercantile cited to support contractibility. There are a 
limited number of non-New Jersey references to the House of Lords judgment, n 124 above, in this case 
which addressed the question of what amounted to adequate disclosure and a couple of non-New Jersey 
cases which refer to Lord Hatherley’s judgment for other reasons. There is one New Hampshire case, 
Ashuelot R.R.Co. v Elliot 57 N.H. 397, and one New York case, Metropolitan Elevated RW Co. v Manhattan 
RW. Co. 11 Daly 373, that refer to Lord Hatherley’s judgment in Imperial Mercantile Association in relation 
to self-dealing but as support for the strict voidability rule and not in relation to contractibility.  
184 Marsh, n 15 above, 45-46, gives a personal account of the drafting of these provisions when he was a 
law firm associate. An example of contracting out language is provided in W.M. Fletcher, Corporation 
Forms and Precedents (2nd ed, 1928), §§ 1031-1032. 
185 There are only very few cases which consider contractual opting out of the strict rule which date from 
the 1930s. This suggests that such provisions were very rare until later in the 20th century. The discussion 
and invalidation of such an opt-out in the New York case of Whalen v Hudson, n 96 above (refers to an 
opt-out as ‘this most unusual provision’), and citing H. Broom, Legal Maxims (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. 
Johnson & Co., 8th ed, 1882), 289 (that ‘unusual clauses always excite suspicion’). 
186 See W.J. Carney, ‘The ALI’s Corporate Governance Project: The Death of Property Rights’ (1993) 61 
Geo. Wash L. Rev. 898, relying on Marsh and assuming adoption equals effectiveness. 
187 On the inability to contract out of ‘settled legal principles’ without explicit authority to do so, see 
Audenried v East Coast Milling Co., n 90 above. 
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into the twentieth century.188  Juxtaposing the evolution of UK self-dealing 
regulation with that of New Jersey, which in historical perspective is the United 
States’ most important corporate law jurisdiction, we see that the path of self-
dealing law is, in a significant respect, a function of the conception of the 
corporation.    
 
2. New York 
a. Channels of fiduciary law 
Alongside Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co, the New York case of Munson v Syracuse,189 
decided in the fall of 1886, is the standard bearer of the strict approach to self-
dealing providing for the automatic voidability of the transaction.190 Munson 
involved a petition for specific performance of an executory contract between the 
company and its director. Judge Andrews, for the Court of Appeals of New York, 
held that self-dealing contracts are ‘repugnant to the great rule of law which 
invalidates all contracts made by a trustee or fiduciary, in which he is personally 
interested at the election of the party he represents’. The judgment cites and 
follows the holding in Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie. Accordingly, the court ‘does not 
stop to inquire whether the contract or the transaction was fair or unfair’, nor did 
it matter that he was only one of ten participating directors and that the others 
were disinterested: ‘The law cannot accurately measure the influence of a trustee 
with his associates.’ Earlier, if less celebrated, examples of the New York courts 
expressing similar sentiments include: the Court of Appeals judgments in Barnes v 
Brown191 and Butts v Wood192 and the New York Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cumberland Coal & Iron Company v Sherman,193 applying Maryland law, all of which 
rely upon Aberdeen Railway.    
One way of telling the story of self-dealing law in New York, and of 
problematising Marsh’s stage theory, is to juxtapose the strict approach taken in 
Munson next to alternative, and apparently contradictory, approaches found in the 
case law during this period. Indeed there are several early New York cases which 
suggest, or explicitly adopt, a fairness approach to self-dealing. For example, in 
Gamble v Water,194 in 1890, a case that admittedly is not directly on point as it 
involves shareholder ratification of a self-dealing transaction between the director 
and the company, the court is concerned to assess the ‘fair value to the company 
                                                     
188 That some limited contractibility in relation to the voidability rule is suggested by Hodge v United States 
Steel Corp., n 165 above, which approved of a by-law amendment clarifying that self-dealing ratified by a 
majority of the outstanding shares would be treated as if ratified by all shareholders, addressing any 
concerns that a unanimous vote would be required for ratification. Note that this does not alter the legal 
principle simply the procedural mode of approval. See Whalen v Hudson, n 96 above, for an explicit 
invalidation of contracting-out under New York law.  
189 Munson v Syracuse, G. & C. Ry. Co. 58 Sickels 58. 
190 Marsh, n 15 above, 37. 
191 35 Sickels 527 (1880). 
192 n 152 above. 
193 30 Barb. 553 (1859). 
194 123 N.Y. 91 (1890). 
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of the property purchased’.   Shortly after Gamble v Water in Sage v Culver,195 
decided in 1895, the New York Court of Appeals held that ‘when it appears that 
the trustee or officer has violated the moral obligation to refrain from placing 
himself in relations which ordinarily produce a conflict between self-interest and 
integrity, there is, in equity, a presumption against the transaction, which he is 
required to explain’. To ‘explain’ it the court provided that the director must ‘show 
that [the transaction] was fair, and that no undue influence has been taken by him 
of his position, for his own advantage or the advantage of some other corporation 
in which he has an interest’. Sage v Culver is probably the most important of all 
New York self-dealing cases because, as detailed below, it was relied upon in 
multiple subsequent cases resulting ultimately in the clear adoption of the fairness 
standard. 
However, an account of New York self-dealing law that involves identifying a 
strand of strict self-dealing cases and a separate and distinctive strand of fairness-
based cases misses the key point about the source and evolution of New York 
self-dealing law. As does a story that attempts to fit these strands of case law into 
sequential chronological boxes. The real story of New York self-dealing law is how 
English trust and fiduciary law – clearly adopted by the New York courts in the 
early 18th century – with their bilateral relationships of trustee and beneficiary and 
attorney and client, are translated into the tri-lateral context of the corporation, the 
board of directors, and the stockholders.  From this vantage point Munson is 
consistent with Sage, and fairness review fits with the strict voidability rule.  
English 18th and 19th century trust and fiduciary law made a distinction, 
which it continues to make today, between regulating the exercise of delegated 
power and regulating influence.196 In relation to the exercise of delegated power, it 
provided that a fiduciary cannot exercise that power in a way that benefits herself. 
One outcrop of this rule was that she could not therefore enter into a contract 
with herself. Although in theory the courts could have attempted to factually 
assess whether or not the contract represented a loyal, indeed self-sacrificing, 
exercise of power by the fiduciary, the courts of equity in the 18th and 19th 
centuries expressed reservations about the reliability of evidence to make this 
determination and the ability of the courts to assess this evidence.197 Given such 
evidentiary obstacles the courts elected to protect the fiduciary relationship by 
prohibiting the transactions, regardless of whether or not they were good for the 
trust. Accordingly, a trustee was prohibited from entering into a contract in her 
personal capacity to buy trust assets without the unanimous consent of the 
beneficiaries. The most famous statement of the law in this regard was made in 
                                                     
195 147 N.Y. 241 (1896). 
196 J.C. Shepherd, Law of Fiduciaries (Toronto: Carswell, 1981), observing at 156 that ‘the basic theoretical 
distinction between dealings with the ‘corpus’ and dealings with the ‘beneficiary’ is that in the former the 
fiduciary’s power is one of control, while in the latter his power is one of influence’. 
197 Ex Parte James, 8 Ves. Jun. 338 (1803) ; Ex Parte Lacey, n 118 above. 
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1803 by Lord Eldon in Ex Parte Lacey where he said that the rule ‘is not that a 
trustee cannot buy from a cestui que trust, but that he shall not buy from himself’.   
The courts of equity took a less demanding approach to dealings between the 
fiduciary and his charge, for example, dealings between a trustee and a beneficiary 
unrelated to the trust assets or between attorney and client. Equity would also 
countenance a transaction with trust assets where, to use Lord Eldon’s words, the 
fiduciary ‘shakes off the obligation, that attaches upon him as trustee’. Although 
such arrangements were subject to the ‘most guarded jealousy’, they were not 
prohibited without regard to the terms of the arrangement. This distinction makes 
sense: in the former context the fiduciary wields power on both sides of the 
transaction; in the latter she does not exercise power for the counterparty to the 
transaction. Although the pre-existing relationship may enable her to exercise 
significant influence over the counterparty, the conflict is less acute than when she 
sits on both sides of a transaction. Here the regulatory objective is to ensure that 
the terms of the transaction are not the product of undue or self-serving influence 
by the fiduciary. Lord Eldon’s jurisprudence is again central to setting out the 
English courts' approach. In Gibson v Jeyes,198 an 1802 case brought against a 
financial advisor by the estate of the advisee, Lord Eldon observed: 
 
Whenever, however, the relations between the contracting parties appear to 
be of such a character as to render it certain that they do not deal on terms of 
equality but that either on the one side from superior knowledge of the 
matter derived from a fiduciary relation, or from overmastering influence, or 
on the other from weakness, dependence, or trust justifiably reposed, unfair 
advantage in a transaction is rendered probable, there the burden is shifted, 
the transaction is presumed void, and it is incumbent upon the stronger party 
to show affirmatively that no deception was practiced, no undue influence 
was used, and that all was fair, open, voluntary and well understood. 
 
In the 1833 case of Hunter v Atkins199 the Lord Chancellor, Lord Brougham 
outlined the standard applicable to such relationships as follows: 
 
There are certain relations known to law as attorney, guardian, trustee.  If a 
person standing in these relations to client, ward, cestui que trust, takes a gift, or 
makes a bargain, the proof lies upon him that he has dealt with the other 
party […] exactly as a stranger would have done, taking no advantage of his 
influence or knowledge, putting the other party on his guard, bringing 
everything to his knowledge which he himself knew.200 
                                                     
198 6 Ves. 266 (1802). 
199 (1834) Cooper T. Brougham 464. 
200 47 E.R. 166 (1834). Applying this rule to the purchase by the trustee of property from the beneficiary, 
see Thomson v Eastwood (1877) 2 App. Cas. 215, per Lord Cairns L.C.: ‘If challenged in proper time, Equity 
will examine into it, will examine the value that was paid by the trustee, and will throw upon the trust the 
onus of proving that he gave full value and that all information was laid before the cestui que trust when 
it was sold.’ 
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New York fiduciary law in the mid to late-19th century clearly adopted English 
law’s distinction between power and influence as well as the Ex parte Lacey and 
Gibson v Jeyes applicable standards. In the New York Court of Appeals case of 
Cowee v Cornell201 decided in 1878, the court in considering the validity of an 
agreement between a deceased grandfather and his grandson, without attribution 
or citation, quoted verbatim the above extract from Gibson v Jeyes and observed 
further that: 
 
This doctrine is well settled202 […] The principle referred to it must be 
remembered is distinct from that absolutely forbidding a purchase by a 
trustee or agent for his own benefit of the subject of a trust, and charging it 
when so purchased with the trust. That amounts to an incapacity in the 
fiduciary to purchase of himself. He cannot act for himself at all however 
fairly or innocently in any dealing as to which he has duties as trustee or 
agent. The reason of this rule is subjective. It removes from the trustee, with 
the power, all temptation to commit any breach of trust for his own benefit. 
But the principle with which we are now concerned does not absolutely 
forbid the dealing, but it presumes it unfair and fraudulent unless the contrary 
is affirmatively shown (emphasis supplied). 
 
At the heart of the problem of how to regulate self-dealing contracts between 
corporations and their directors is the determination of whether the contract in 
question involves the exercise of power or of influence by the self-dealing director. 
Following the structure of 19th century fiduciary law, if the transaction involves 
the exercise of power, then it is subject to the strict structural loyalty-based 
approach that prohibits such transactions regardless of actual loyalty and renders 
them voidable at the corporation’s or its shareholders’ election. If the transaction 
involves influence, then the standard is a fairness standard. The fiduciary influence 
standard is referred to in some of the cases, primarily the non-corporate cases, as a 
doctrine of ‘constructive fraud’.203  
                                                     
201   75 N.Y. 91 (1878).   
202 The Court cites ‘Hunt, J. Nesbit v. Lockman, 34 N. Y., 167; Story's Eq. Jur., § 311; Sears v. Shafer, 2 Seld., 
268; Huguenin v. Basely, 13 Ves., 105; S. C., 14 Id., 273; S. C., 15 Id., 180; Wright v. Proud, 13 Id., 138; Harris 
v. Tremenheere, 15 Id., 40; Edwards v. Myrick, 2 Hare, 60; Hunter v. Atkins, 3 My. & K., 113’; for other cases 
articulating the influence fairness standard see Andrews J in the Court of Appeals. The same judge who 
decided Munson v Syracuse, n 189 above, in Whitehead v Kennedy 24 Sickels 462 (1877) (citing Gibson v Jeyes, 
n 198 above); and the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Fisher v Bishop 63 Sickels 25 (1888), holding that 
‘fiduciary relations exist, and there has been a confidence reposed which invests the person trusted with 
an advantage in treating with the person so confiding. Freelove v. Cole, 41 Barb. 318, affirmed 41 N. Y. 619; 
Ford v. Harrington, 16 N. Y. 285. When this relation is shown to exist, it imposes the burden of proof upon 
the person taking securities, or making contracts inuring to his benefit, to show that the transaction is just 
and fair, and that he has derived no unfair advantage from his fiduciary relation’ (citing Gibson v Jeyes, n 
198 above). 
203 See, for example: Metropolitan El. Ry. Co. v Manhattan El. Ry. Co 14 Abb. N. Cas. 103 (1884); Cowee v 
Cornell 10 Sickels 91 (1878); Butler v Prentiss 12 E.H. Smith 49 (1899); Rosevear v Sullivan 62 N.Y.S. 447 
(1900); Ten Eyck v Craig 17 Sickels 406 (1875). 
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There are two difficulties involved in translating these standards from trusts 
and other non-corporate fiduciary relations to the corporation. First, following the 
creation of the trust, the trust involves a bilateral relationship between trustee and 
beneficiary. The corporation involves a tri-lateral relationship between corporation 
as an entity and its constituent parts or organs of the board and the shareholder 
meeting. This transplantation of the fiduciary standards from a bilateral to the 
trilateral relationship creates the following problem: is the corporation the trust, or 
is it the beneficiary? Secondly, the relationship of trustee to trust assets and trust 
power is not easily transplantable to the corporate context. The trustee holds legal 
title to the trust’s assets. A transaction with trust property is therefore not legally 
possible without the trustee’s involvement.  A director of the corporation does not 
hold legal title to the corporation’s assets which is, of course, vested in the 
corporation itself. Furthermore, although directors may be fiduciaries of the 
corporation, it is the directors acting collectively, as a board, not the individual 
directors, that possess and wield corporate power,204 and it is possible for the 
board to wield power without the actual participation of a director who wishes to 
enter into a contract with the company. If the director participates in the board 
decision to enter into the self-dealing contract, then power is wielded, the director 
sits on both sides of the transaction, and the corporation, in the trust analogy, is 
the trust. However, if the director does not participate in the transaction, then 
power is not wielded, although influence maybe, and the corporation looks more 
like the beneficiary than the trust. 
Early UK authority dealing with unincorporated companies suggested that 
the ‘paralysing’ of the director's role to enable self-dealing arrangements was not 
possible.205 The issue was placed partially in play in Aberdeen Railway v Blaikie 
where the court considered whether the fact that Blaikie ‘was one of a body of 
directors’ made any difference to the applicable standard. The court rejected this 
position observing that it was the director's duty to give the company the full 
benefit of his knowledge and skill. Of course, although in the minority, Blaikie had 
exercised power so the court was not faced with the situation where the director 
had abstained or had not attended the meeting. This holding was subsequently 
interpreted more broadly in Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman,206 as a 
general prohibition on any director entering into a transaction, regardless of 
whether he participated in the decision or not, as the company had ‘a right to the 
entire services of the director, and to the advice of every director in giving his 
opinion upon matters brought before the board’. Accordingly, English courts 
refused to allow directors to dissociate themselves from power, to in Lord Eldon's 
words ‘shake off the obligation,’ just as a trustee could not divulge himself of 
power without revoking his trusteeship. This rendered a self-dealing transaction a 
transaction which always involved the exercise of director power, regardless of 
                                                     
204 Of course individual directors wield power delegated to them by the board of directors.  
205 Benson v Heathorn, n 120 above. 
206 n 122 above. 
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formal voting participation. The fiduciary influence standard was thereby 
sidestepped.  
This UK approach is consistent with the 19th century UK conception of the 
incorporated company that was partially blind towards the entity; where the real 
participants, as in its ‘predecessor’ unincorporated company, were the trustee 
directors and shareholders. That is, the UK incorporated company was viewed 
bilaterally and therefore it was easier to view a director's relationship to corporate 
power in the same way as a trustee’s individual relationship to trust power. 
Consider Lindley on board power and the analogy between trust and company: 
 
The property of the company may not be legally vested in the directors [DK-
as it would be if it were a trust], but it is practically under their control; and 
they are bound to employ it for the purposes for which it was entrusted to them. 
So the powers which the directors have, eg., of calling meetings, electing 
members of their own board, allotting, transferring and forfeiting shares, 
making calls, etc., etc., are reposed in them in order that such powers may be 
bona fide exercised for the benefit of the company as a whole; and any 
exercise of such powers for other purposes is a breach of trust and will be 
treated accordingly (emphasis supplied).207  
 
Note that Lindley refers to powers ‘which the directors have’. In a deed of 
settlement / unincorporated company corporate power was delegated to the 
directors of the company and not, in the first instance, to a board of directors or a 
‘court of directors’. In a deed of settlement company there is no entity or body or 
organ of that entity, but only individual persons to whom power is delegated. 
While the deed of settlement would typically provide for the collective exercise of 
that power, the power itself resided in each of the directors themselves.  This 
required therefore that the deed of settlement provide that when some directors 
were not present that the ‘court of directors’ could act and would ‘have all the 
powers and authorities vested in the directors for the time being, as if all were 
present’ (emphasis supplied).208 That is, the court of directors brought together the 
power vested in each of the individual directors in order for that power to be 
exercised collectively. Consistently with this approach the delegation of power to 
directors in an incorporated UK company has never typically been to a board of 
directors, but rather to ‘the directors’.209 This is also why English courts 
                                                     
207 Lindley, n 27 above. 
208 Benson v Heathorn, n 120 above. 
209 For example, default constitution – the Table A articles – issued pursuant to the Companies Act 1862 
provides that the ‘business of the company shall be managed by the directors, who may pay all expenses 
incurred in getting up and registering the company, and may exercise all the powers of the company’. 
Although the term ‘board of directors’ is used elsewhere in the articles, it is not used in relation to the 
empowerment of directors or the procedures which they have to follow to exercise power. For example, 
‘The directors may delegate any of their powers to committees consisting of such member or members of 
their body as they think fit.’ Article 68 (emphasis supplied). The Aberdeen Railway Company was a 
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sometimes refer to corporate powers as ‘fiduciary powers’: powers entrusted to 
fiduciaries, to be exercised in accordance with their fiduciary duties.210 Director 
power was something directors had as a result of being a director and not as a 
result of attending and participating in the board meeting. Accordingly, English 
law’s answer to the question posed by the House of Lords in Aberdeen Railway as to 
whether the director was ‘acting in the case now before us’ is that participation is 
irrelevant because when the board makes a decision the powers held by all the 
directors is exercised. As power is necessarily exercised the applicable fiduciary 
standard is the strict voidability standard, even for the non-participating self-
dealing director. 
In contrast, in a New York corporation power resided not in the directors 
individually with a mandate to act collectively but in the board of directors itself. 
The New York general incorporation statute for manufacturing companies, as 
amended as of 1860, provided that the ‘stock, property and concerns of such 
company shall be managed by not less than three, nor more than thirteen trustees’. 
The Revised statutes of 1861 provided for quorum requirements in relation to the 
exercise of power by the trustees and that ‘every decision by a majority of the 
persons duly assembled as a board, shall be valid as a corporate act’. Writing in 
1882 Victor Morowetz observed that ‘the active management and direction of the 
affairs of a trading corporation are ordinarily vested in a board of directors or 
trustees’.211  By 1892 the New York General Corporation Law provided that ‘the 
affairs of every corporation shall be managed by its board of directors [and that] 
the act of a majority of the directors present at the meeting at which the quorum is 
present shall be the act of the board of directors.’212  Power in a 19th century New 
York corporation did not reside in the directors themselves but in the board of 
directors, which was empowered to exercise corporate power in the absence of 
less than a majority of the directors. Directors who did not attend a board meeting 
at which a decision was made did not exercise corporate power. As Paul Ames put 
it writing in 1887: a director ‘may be deemed to be relieved of any trust relation to 
the stockholders, except in so far as his own individual action may affect the 
complete exercise of the power lodged in the whole board’.213 Logically, therefore, 
the fiduciary standard applicable to such a non-participating director in a self-
dealing transaction would be the Gibson v Jeyes influence standard, ie, a fairness 
standard, and where he did participate it would be the stricter Ex Parte Lacey 
power standard. Because of the understanding of director empowerment in a UK 
company this distinction was not available to UK company law, whereas it was 
logical and arguably correct in the New York context. This understanding of 
                                                                                                                                       
chartered company, and its constitution was provided by the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 
which also empowers the directors, rather than the board of directors. § 90. 
210 In re National Provincial Marine Insurance Company (1870) L.R. 5 Ch.App. 559; In re Coalport China Company 
[1895] 2 Ch.404; In re Cawley & Co. (1889) 42 Ch.D. 209. 
211 Morowetz, n 70 above, 229. 
212 The General Corporate Law 1892, § 29. 
213 P. Ames, ‘May a Director Deal with His Corporation’ (1887-1888) 1 Columbia Law Review 193, 193. 
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board power opened a channel through which the established fiduciary influence 
standard could flow into corporate law.214 
To be clear, I am not suggesting a determinate relationship between New 
York corporate law’s understanding of board power and application of the 
fiduciary influence standard. Rather, this understanding of board and director 
empowerment created an opening – a crack in the structure of analysis that drove 
UK law – which provided one means of being responsive to the instrumental 
economic pressures to enable self-dealing. Small disconnects in an argumentative 
structure can drive different legal paths, but, of course, they may not do so. 
Indeed, the New Jersey courts, dealing with corporations with effectively identical 
understandings of board power to their New York counterparts,215 did not take 
this opening and adopted the UK’s approach to director participation, holding that 
the strict voidability rule was applicable even in the absence of director 
participation. The early decisions of the Courts of Maryland took the same 
position. However, even in these jurisdictions where the influence standard was 
rejected the tension between influence and power existed in a way that it did not 
in UK corporate law. For example, in 1861, the Maryland Court of Appeals in 
Cumberland Coal v Sherman,216 following the UK cases of Aberdeen Blaikie and Benson 
v Heathorn, considered and rejected the influence standard. However, in 1875 in 
Cumberland v Parish,217 the Maryland Court of Appeals having reiterated the same 
position then incongruously held that the question of voidability hinged on an 
influence standard: whether ‘reasonable use has been made of [the] confidence’. 
Nor is the claim here that the New York courts were completely closed to the 
adoption of the UK and New Jersey position. Indeed in a limited number of cases, 
which themselves had no impact on the trajectory of New York law, the New 
York courts, relying on Cumberland Coal v Sherman, adopted a position that does 
not depend upon director participation.218 Rather the claim made here, and argued 
                                                     
214 Beveridge argues that this standard was the general by the mid-1870s US self-dealing fiduciary 
standard, citing the trusts case book: J.W. Perry, A Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 2nd ed, 1874), 248-249. We show below how this standard percolated through New York self-
dealing law. This standard did not play a role in New Jersey self-dealing law.   
215 Arguably it is noteworthy for this argument that early New Jersey Corporation statutes did not refer to 
a board, but rather empowered directors directly. See J.J. Treacy and J. Milton, The General Corporation of 
New Jersey (Revision of 1896) (New Jersey: Hudson Print Co., 1921), including all supplements and 
amendments thereto, to the end of the legislative session of 1921 (1921). However, the New Jersey courts 
were clearly of the view that the board and not individual directors were empowered. See, for example: 
Titus v Cairo and Fulton R.R. Co., 37 N.J.L. 98 (1874), observing that ‘the authority of corporate bodies are 
within the exclusive control of the board of directors, from whom authority to dispose of their assets 
must be derived’. 
216 n 193 above. 
217 n 142 above. 
218 In Hoyle v Plattsburgh & MR Co., n 142 above, ‘nor is it possible to limit the duty of a director of a 
corporation, in this respect, to the time while he is acting as a director under any special delegation of 
power, or is in attendance at meetings of the board’. Surprisingly, this case is typically cited alongside 
other authorities supporting the view that the strict standard was dependent on participation – see, for 
example: Globe Woolen Co. v Utica Gas & Electric Co. 75 Misc. 539 (1912), n 142 above, citing Hoyle v 
Plattsburgh & MR Co., for the proposition that ‘if a director enters into a contract between himself and his 
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below, is that in working out how to regulate self-dealing transactions the 
dominant view in New York from the 1860s to the 1890s bought into fiduciary 
law’s distinction between power and influence, a distinction made available by the 
understanding of board and corporate power in a New York corporation. 
Importantly, Harold Marsh, and commentators who have adopted Marsh’s 
position, were aware of this influence strand of fiduciary law and the analogy of 
the corporation to the beneficiary. However, it is viewed as both a marginal and 
unpersuasive ex-post technical justification; a cover for the unspoken drivers of 
legal change.219 Compounding the sense that this justification was outside of the 
mainstream legal position Marsh cites only one 1902 Texas case in support. 
Indeed he suggests that is the only case that made this connection.220 However, in 
New York the influence strand of fiduciary law is neither marginal nor an ex-post 
explanation of legal change. It arises, together with the voidability standard, as a 
result of the courts’ attempts, prior to 1880 and thereafter, to transplant fiduciary 
law to the context of the US corporation.  The courts did not, unsurprisingly, see 
it is as necessary to ‘explain’ the application of a fairness standard because to them 
it did not represent a change in the law. 
 
b. Participating directors and the influence standard 
Many of the early New York cases involved directors who participated in the 
decision to enter into the self-dealing transaction. As they exercised power the 
strict Ex Parte Lacey standard set forth in Aberdeen Blaikie is applicable. But in New 
York one cannot extrapolate from these cases to a generally applicable voidability 
standard. On the contrary the early cases held up as the standard bearers of the 
strict standard take pains to stress the participation of the director in the board 
decision. Underpinning the court's focus on participation is, it is submitted, an 
awareness that the applicable standard depends upon whether power is exercised 
or merely influence exerted. In Butt v Woods, for example, the Court stresses the 
participation of the defendant in the approved transaction.221 In Munson v Syracuse 
there is a pervasive focus on the participation of the director in approving the 
transaction. The Court observed that ‘the contract bound the corporation to 
purchase, and Munson, as one of the directors, participated in the action of the 
corporation in assuming the obligation’; he was ‘one of ten directors who voted in 
favour of the contract’. The court observed further that: ‘the law cannot measure 
the influence of a trustee on his associates […] in an action by the trustee in his 
                                                                                                                                       
corporation, and assumes to act for both, his contract is voidable’; Metropolitan Elevated RW Co. v Manhattan 
RW Co., n 183 above: ‘I think, therefore, that the undoubted rule of law in this state is, that every contract 
entered into by a director with his corporation may be avoided by the corporation within a reasonable 
time, irrespective of the merits of the contract itself’; Merrill v United Box Board & Paper 143 A.D. 833 
(1911). 
219 Marsh, n 15 above, 40, noting that ‘the only explanation which seems to have been given for this 
change in position was the technical one [...]’. Professor Clark observes, ‘[A]t most they made technical, 
analogical arguments’. n 16 above, 161.   
220 Marsh, n 15 above, 40, refers to ‘the only explanation that seems to have been given’ and then quotes 
‘the Texas court’: Tenison v Patton 95 Tex 284, at 292-93 (1902).  
221 See also Barnes v Brown, n 191 above: ‘He could not act as trustee and for himself at the same time.’ 
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private capacity to enforce the contract, in the making of which he participated’. and 
that a strict rule ‘weakens the temptation to dishonesty [in] all transactions in 
which they assume the dual characteristics of principal and representative’ (emphasis 
supplied). Although the judgment has nothing to say about the applicable standard 
when the director abstains or recuses himself from the board’s decision, it 
operates within the dual power / influence fiduciary paradigm. Indeed, in litigation 
related to Munson v Syracuse the Court of Appeals in Munson v Magee222 stressed that 
Munson's role in acting for the corporation was central to the voidability decision: 
 
The post-Munson and Butt cases that adopt a strict voidability approach to the 
facts of the case are relatively few in number. Those that do involve a director 
who participates in the decision. In these cases the courts identify such 
participation. For example, in Koster v Pain,223 the Court of Appeals observed 
that: ‘as in the case of every other trustee or agent, no director can, in acting on 
behalf of the corporation, reserve or secure to himself any advantage or benefit’ 
(emphasis supplied).224  
 
Although the power / influence dichotomy silently structures the most important 
and influential early cases, in the 1880s only one New York case explicitly toys 
with the fiduciary influence fairness standard. This is the case of Rudd v Robinson, 
an 1889 Supreme Court decision, where the court juxtaposes a strict voidability 
rule with the influence standard, voiding certain transactions and subjecting others 
                                                     
222 15 E.h. Smith 182 (1899): "The contract of September 14, 1875, was executed by Munson, Case, and 
Gowen as individuals, owning and controlling the bonds of the Sodus Bay companies, and then by the 
Sodus Bay & Corning Railroad Company, by Munson, its president. No other officer or person executed 
the contract on behalf of the railroad corporation. It was therefore a case where Munson, as an 
individual, stood in the attitude of selling as owner, and purchasing as the president of the corporation, 
and this, as Judge Andrews says, the law will not sanction." 
223 58 N.Y.S. 865 (1899). 
224 Merrill v United Box Board & Paper, n 218 above (relying on Munson v Syracuse, n 189 above, and 
observing that ‘plaintiff voted to approve his own contract’); Miller v Crown Perfumery 109 N.Y.S. 760, 
(1908): ‘this principle flows logically from the fiduciary relation which exists between an officer of a 
corporation and the corporation, which prohibits such officer from voting to himself the property or 
assets of the corporation, or from taking part in any matter affecting his personal interests’, citing Butts v 
Wood, n 152 above; and Barnes v Brown, n 191 above; Jacobson v Brooklyn Lumber Co. 22 Bedell 152 (1906), 
citing both Butts v Wood, n 152 above, and Munson v Syracuse, n 189 above, for the proposition that ‘the 
courts in this state have frequently asserted the void ability of acts and votes of corporate officers, when 
they are affected by private interests’. Strobel v Brownell 16 Misc 567 (1895) (distinguishing Munson v 
Syracuse, n 189 above, on the basis that at the time the contract was made, Munson was a director of the 
purchasing corporation, and took part in making the contract upon which the action was brought); Barr v 
New York, L.E. & W.R. Co 80 Sickels 263 (1891) (distinguishing Munson v Syracuse, n 189 above, on the 
basis that it involved ‘the vice that a director of the defendant corporation was a party to it, and 
participated in the action of the corporation in assuming the obligation’); Beers v New York Life Ins. Co. 66 
Hun 75 (1892) (observing that ‘a director is at liberty to make a contract with his corporation, so long as 
he does not, while acting in his own interest, on the one side, also act, on the other, in the capacity of 
trustee, so that his interest and his duty might conflict’).  
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– involving loans – to the influence standard.225 Absence of explicit consideration 
of this standard in the 1880s could be read as the absence of the standard. This is 
not correct. When placed within the context of this fiduciary power / influence 
paradigm we can see that the early strict decisions themselves operated within this 
paradigm and thereby accepted a role for a fairness standard for self-dealing 
transactions even though on the facts of those cases, as power was exercised, the 
voidability standard applied.  
Responding to Beveridge’s observation that in many of the voidability cases 
the director participated in the transaction,226 Cary and Eisenberg argue that, 
although this may be correct, ‘the opinions did not limit the rule to such cases’. 
Indeed, in the absence of the above fiduciary context a literal reading of the cases 
would identify no explicit limit. But with this context we can see that voidability 
was connected to power, which explains the courts’ focus on participation, and 
that fairness would have been applicable had power not been exercised.  
This fiduciary paradigm also enables us to explain the apparent disconnect 
between the cases and leading New York commentators in this period. Professor 
Beveridge, in support of his argument that fairness review was established very 
early in US self-dealing law, cites Victor Morawetz, a New York attorney,227 who 
in 1880 opined that ‘there is no impropriety in a contract between a director and 
the corporation, if the latter is represented by other agents’. In the 1886 edition of 
his book Morawetz observes that a quorate board is empowered to act on behalf 
of the company and provided the agent (the director) does not participate then the 
transaction is sound. However, ‘even if [the corporation] is represented by a 
majority of the board, [the transaction] will always be scrutinised by the courts 
with strictness, and will be set aside at the suit of the corporation, upon proof of 
the slightest unfairness or imposition practised upon it’.228 In rejecting Beveridge’s 
arguments Cary and Eisenberg argue that the commentators in this period go 
further than the majority of the cases.229 But they do not. Although one does not 
find a New York case in the 1880s that explicitly states the law in the terms 
outlined by Morawetz, he understood Butts and Munson to be articulations of the 
existing power / influence fiduciary position which was consistent with his 
statement. As Morawetz observed: ‘[T]he principle acted upon in these cases is a 
                                                     
225 Following Twin Lick Oil Co. v Marbury 91 U.S. 587. cf Hoyle v Plattsburgh and Montreal Railroad Company, 
n 142 above, following Benson v Heathorn, n 120 above, suggesting that such disability was not possible; 
although the director in this case participated in the decision to auction corporate assets. 
226 Beveridge, n 135 above observes that ‘if we examine the cases cited by Professor Marsh in support of 
his assertion that interested director contracts were voidable in spite of fairness, we shall see that the 
cases were actually concerned with transactions in which the interested director was active in representing 
both sides of the deal’.  Beveridge does not proceed to explain this in terms of the background fiduciary 
standards.  
227 Morawetz joined the well-known New York corporate law firm, Cravath, in 1887. See R.T. Swaine, 
The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors: 1818-1947, Vol 3 (New York: Ad Press, 2007), 381. 
228 Morawetz’s second edition was reviewed by Professor Ames in the Harvard Law Review where he 
referred to it as ‘the best treatise on the subject of corporations’. (1887) 1 Harv. L. Rev. 109. 
229 Cary and Eisenberg, n 136 above, 651: ‘the strongest support for this argument comes from a few 
cases and the leading treatises of the time’; ‘a clear majority of the cases support Marsh’. 
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general principle of the law of agency.’230 Accordingly, fairness review in New 
York does not, as Marsh demanded, need to be justified as a departure from the 
strict voidability rule and the policies underpinning such a rule. It represents to 
19th century New York lawyers an available stream of fiduciary doctrine that sits 
alongside the voidability rule and whose applicability is dependent on the role of 
the director in relation to the transaction in question. 
 
c. Entrenching fairness review 
It is in the 1890s that the influence doctrine comes to the fore in New York. The 
Court of Appeals decision in Sage v Culver which, as noted above, adopted an 
explicit fairness-based approach rooted in the fiduciary influence standard.231  The 
court in Sage cites, but does not discuss, Gibson v Jeyes and Cowee v Cornell as 
authority for the fairness standard. For Sage v Culver fairness review is a product of 
the courts viewing self-dealing through equity’s lens of influence and not of 
power. However, it is true that the rigour of equity’s distinction between power 
and influence is not always maintained in this and subsequent cases that adopt the 
influence standard. The court in Sage does not appear to limit its holding to the 
non-participating director. Accordingly, if Sage represents a moment of legal 
change it is not one that moves from voidability to fairness, but one that arguably 
commences the disconnection of the influence standard from the absence of the 
exercise of directorial power.   
The source of fairness review in Sage v Culver is readily traceable to the 
fiduciary influence doctrine. However, multiple other New York cases in the 
1880s and 1890s which also took the view that self-dealing contracts were 
permissible subject to fairness review are not so clearly traceable to the fiduciary 
influence doctrine. Nevertheless, most of those cases fit within the non-power 
paradigm. The implication that these approaches were influenced or formed by 
that paradigm is irresistible. For example, in 1880 the New York Court of Appeals 
in Van Brunt held that the ability of officers of a railroad company to enter into 
contracts with the corporation ‘cannot be seriously questioned’ provided that ‘no 
special advantage accrued to the defendant from the contract, and as there is no 
proof of any fraud’. In Gamble v Water, referred to above, the Court of Appeals 
                                                     
230 V. Morawetz, A Treatise on The Law of Corporations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1886), 485, para 518. See also 
H. Taylor, The Law of Private Corporations (Philadelphia: Kay & Brother, 1888), a text with strong New 
York influences (Taylor was a member of the New York Bar). Although Taylor does not state the rule as 
clearly as Morawetz, his analysis is structured by participation: ‘A director or other corporate officer can 
on behalf of corporation make with himself no contract that will bind the corporation. Accordingly a 
resolution of the board of trustees of a corporation carried by the casting vote of the president ratifying 
an unauthorised act of his, in which he was personally interested is void.’ 580.   
231 Sage v Culver, n 195 above, is a central but largely forgotten case for US commentators. The case only 
attracts seven citations from a Westlaw Journals and Review’s search, only one of which considers Sage v 
Culver in the text of the article: C.M. Dickinson, ‘Interested Directors of New York Corporation and the 
Burden of Proof’ (1988) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 91, 95-97. See also Beveridge, n 135 above, citing but not 
considering the case in detail, and L.B. Homer, ‘The Status of the Fairness Test under Section 713 of the 
New York Business Corporation Law’ (1976) 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1156. 
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applied a non-participating director / fairness standard. In Strobel v Brownell in 
1895, distinguishing Munson because of the absence of the exercise of power and 
following Gamble v Water, the New York Supreme Court held that: 
 
Every such contract made by a director of a company with a corporation is 
looked at with suspicion, and if the transaction is attacked the burden is upon 
the agent of the corporation, who has contracted with it, to show that it was 
honest and fair in all its parts, and that he has made no more profit out of the 
contract than any other person might properly have made. 
 
Identifying evolutionary shifts in legal doctrine and attributing time periods within 
which they took place is a precarious task. The selection of a date immediately 
exposes the author to counterclaim based on an alternative set of cases. The 
common law is typically very obliging as there are many cases and many mistakes. 
What this section has attempted to demonstrate is that the cases from Butt v Woods 
to Sage v Culver represent not change but continuity underpinned by longstanding 
fiduciary doctrine. This period of continuity continues well into the 20th century. 
For example, the first instance judgment of Davids v Davids in 1909 appears 
initially to take a firm power-based voidability approach to allegedly excessive 
officer salaries but then, possibly influenced by a factual counterclaim that the 
directors had abstained from taking part in the decision, suggests that the 
applicable standard is a Sage fairness-based approach placing the burden on the 
directors to prove fairness, which in this case they failed to do.232 In Globe Woolen 
Co. v Utica Gas & Electric, a 1918 case, the trial court upheld an executory contract 
between corporations with common directors. The court distinguished the 
automatic voidability rules applicable where the director acts, citing Butt v Woods 
and Munson v Syracuse, from the situation, citing Strobell v Brownell and Gamble v 
Queens, where the director does not participate. The Court held that provided 
‘there being no fraud, conspiracy, bad faith or concealment, a valid contract may 
be made between a corporation and one of its directors.’ On appeal, Judge 
Cardozo in the Court of Appeals reversed the New York Supreme Court’s ruling 
but in so doing applied the same legal framework as the first instance court. The 
Court of Appeals held that the strict rule in Munson did not apply as the director 
had not participated in the decision but observed that ‘a dominating influence may 
be exerted in other ways than by a vote’. Accordingly, the Court held that: 
 
There was, then, a relation of trust reposed, of influence exerted, of superior 
knowledge on the one side and legitimate dependence on the other (Sage v. 
Culver; Davids v. Davids). At least, a finding that there was this relation has 
evidence to sustain it. A trustee may not cling to contracts thus won, unless 
their terms are fair and just.   
                                                     
232  See also Carr v Kimball 153 A.D. 825 (1912), for a similarly degree of schizophrenia about the 
relationship between power and the applicable standard, citing Davids v Davids, 120 N.Y.S. 350 (1909), 
and Sage v Culver, n 195 above. 




The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts as the ‘unfairness is startling’.  
Although Globe represents a clear reassertion of the power / influence 
framework, it represents a high watermark in this regard. Post-1920, although 
there are cases that firmly assert the power / influence framework rendering 
transactions voidable simply because of the exercise of power,233 the Sage v Culver 
fairness standard together with a disregard for the distinction between power and 
influence comes to dominate.234 In some instances reference to Sage v Culver is left 
behind; its influence based fairness standard detached from the case itself.  This is 
seen most clearly in the first instance judgment in La Vin v La Vin,235 and the per 
curiam affirmation by the Court of Appeals,236 a decision which Marsh describes 
as ‘shamefaced’ for failing to address what he views as a departure from the strict 
rule.237 However, commonly Sage is cited as authority for a fairness-based standard 
which applies regardless of director participation in the board decision.238 Munson v 
Syracuse is not forgotten during this transition to fairness review,239 regardless of 
participation, but at worst it is cited in support of the general fairness standard,240 
and at best as support for the position that the distribution of the burden of proof 
is dependent upon whether the director participated.241  
This is the unexplained shift in New York case law which Marsh rightly 
identifies: from non-participating / non-power-wielding director and fairness to 
just fairness regardless of whether power or just influence is exercised. It is not 
unexplained in common law evolutionary terms because Sage v Culver itself, a 
Court of Appeals case, appeared to ignore fiduciary law’s prerequisite of non-
participation and thereby offered a platform for a fairness-only approach – a 
platform that the courts readily adopted by following the ‘rule stated in Sage v 
Culver’.242 But this shift is unexplained, indeed inexplicable, in policy terms, for it 
                                                     
233 There are very few of these cases: Hauben v Morris 161 Misc 174 (1936). 
234 See Schall v Althaus 208 A.D. 103 (1924); Cleary v Oppenheimer 154 Misc. 158 (1934); Blaustein v Pan 
American Petroleum & Transport 174 Misc. 601 (1940), all of which quote extensively from Sage v Culver, n 
195 above. 
235 La Vin v La Vin 283 A.D. 809 (1954).  
236 La Vin v La Vin 305 N.Y. 598 (1953). 
237 Marsh, n 15 above, 41. 
238 Schall v Althaus, n 234 above; Everett v Phillips 288 N.Y. 227 (1942) (the Court of Appeals held that the 
dual position of directors did render the transaction void but subjected it to fairness review); Bayer v Beran 
49 N.Y.S. 2d 2 (1944); Stearns v Dudley 76 N.Y.S 2d 106 (1947); In re Meyer’s Estate 119 N.Y.S. 2d 737 
(1953) (fairness review applicable when a director is ‘serving two masters’); Wohl v Miller 5 A.D.2d 126 
(1958) (explicitly connecting actual participation to fairness review); Foley v D’Agostino 248 N.Y.S. 2d 121 
(1964); Kaminsky v Kahn 259 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1965); Strax v Murray Hill Mews Owners Corp. 809 N.Y.S. 2d 
759 (2005).  
239 Munson v Syracuse, n 189 above, is regularly cited in the non-corporate context of trusts and wills. For 
example: In re Grace’s Estate 247 N.Y.S. 2d 695 (1964); In re Dickson’s Estate 237 N.Y.S. 2d 572 (1963). 
There are very few post-Globe Wollen Co. v Utica Gas & Electric Co., n 142 above / Munson v Syracuse, n 189 
above, cites in corporate cases.  
240 Strax, n 238 above, citing Sage v Culver, n 195 above, and Munson v Syracuse, n 189 above, as authorities 
for fairness review. 
241 Hazzard v Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York 159 Misc 57 (1936). 
242 Blaustein v Pan American Petroleum & Transport, n 234 above; Cleary v Oppenheimer, n 234 above. 
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was clearly not necessary to adjust to the instrumental economic need for self-
dealing. As discussed in Part I of this article, in the UK where companies and 
shareholders had complete contractual freedom to fashion self-dealing rules they 
typically elected for a disinterested director mechanism, the failure to comply with 
which would attract the strict voidability rule. Perhaps then regulatory competition 
or the effects of repeat player litigation by management – or more accurately 
persistently similar claims made by different managers – has some explanatory 
power here. However, the repeat player litigation claim appears unpersuasive when 
one considers the parties and the courts and judges which decided these cases.  In 
none of the cases cited during this transitional period does the same defendant or 
the same judge appear twice. Nor are self-dealing defendants archetypal repeat 
players:243 company resources could not be deployed to defend these actions; 
indemnification to the extent provided for was at this time of doubtful legality;244 
and the plaintiffs appeared to be well resourced as typically they were either 
significant shareholders suing derivatively or liquidators. Regulatory competition 
as an explanatory factor is dinted by the fact that Sage v Culver, as early as 1895, 
appeared to ignore the power / influence distinction, as well as by the fact that in 
several of the 20th century cases where fairness is adopted and the distinction is 
ignored the decision itself does not favour management, suggesting that those 
judges were not receptive to the claims that New York law needed to adjust in 
favour of managers in order to attract re-incorporations.245 A persuasive 
explanation is not available. But one cannot disregard an explanation that 
discounts politics, pressure groups, and rational responses of law-makers to those 
pressures and sees legal change as the result of a fair pinch of incompetence in 
reading the cases and applying the common law method.  
 
3. Delaware's borrowed goods 
What is striking about Delaware self-dealing case law is the lack of it. Delaware has 
no place in the first two stages of Marsh’s evolution of self-dealing cases because 
there are no cases. Marsh refers to no Delaware cases before 1948.246 What is truly 
remarkable about Delaware is that it became the leading corporate law state with 
very little common law. Indeed, if one was to take 1920 as a cut-off point it would 
be very difficult to say anything at all about the effects of charter competition on 
corporate law by reference to Delaware law, as there was close to nothing in 
several key areas of corporate law that one could say was Delaware law – the 
statute was borrowed directly from New Jersey, and there were hardly any 
                                                     
243 M. Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 
9 Law and Society Rev. 1. 
244 See text to nn 101-104 above. 
245 See for example Schall v Althaus, n 234 above; Stearns v Dudley, n 238 above. Other cases, of course, 
would fit in the race to the bottom paradigm: see for example Everett v Phillips, n 238 above, or Bayer v 
Beran, n 238 above. 
246 Citing Blish v Thompson Automatic Arms Corp. 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1948), in relation 
to the discussion of whether an interested director could be counted for the purpose of determining 
whether the board is quorate. The earlier Federal case of Hand v Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. 54 F. Sup. 
649 (D.Del. 1944), is cited in relation to board expenses in a proxy fight.  
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important Delaware cases. The lack of authority clearly creates open space for 
judges to carve-out solutions that that are tailored to its primary constituencies. 
However, when placed in the context of the above analysis of New Jersey and 
New York self-dealing law, we see clearly that Delaware self-dealing law is rooted 
in the approaches formed in other states. It borrows from and brings together 
those approaches. In doing so it asserts its independence through only limited 
citation of its neighbours' cases upon which Delaware law rests.      
Delaware law on self-dealing commences in the 1920s with the important 
case of Cahall v Lofland247. In this case, both the Chancery Court and the Supreme 
Court of Delaware invalidated the payment of remuneration and the issuance of 
shares to a corporation's directors. Both courts rely on Du Pont v Du Pont, a 
Delaware District Court case applying New Jersey law, which observed, without 
citing authority, that ‘if [the director] acts for himself in matters where his interest 
conflicts with his duty, the law holds the transaction constructively fraudulent and 
voidable at the election of the corporation’.248 The language of constructive fraud 
echoes the power / influence fiduciary dichotomy which was so influential in New 
York, although whereas the term is usually used to refer to the regulation of 
influence,249 here, unusually, it is connected to the exercise of power.250 Following 
this statement the Chancery Court then proceeds to rely on the New Jersey case of 
Gardner v Butler to understand the application of this rule. It extracts two principles 
from Gardner: a disinterested director principle and a fairness principle. In Gardner 
the board resolution was passed by a majority of interested directors. As observed 
above, Gardner followed Stewart v Lehigh Valley Co., which viewed interested 
director non-participation as irrelevant. Nevertheless, for the Chancery Court in 
Cahall the facts of Gardner serve as the basis for its holding that majority interested 
director participation renders the transaction constructively fraudulent and 
therefore voidable. The judgment does not articulate the standard of review for 
transactions that are approved by a majority of disinterested directors, although 
the language of constructive fraud implies fairness review. Secondly, it observes 
that Gardner provides that although the contract cannot stand if voided, the 
director-counterparty to the contract is entitled to his due as it ‘would be 
manifestly inequitable to deny the trustee a fair equivalent therefore’.251   
                                                     
247 12 Del. Ch. 299 (1921). 
248 Du Pont v Du Pont 242 F.98 (1917). The judge in Du Pont cites no authorities for this proposition. 
249 For example, in Cowee v Cornell, n 203 above, citing among others the UK case of Hunter v Atkins 3 
My. & K, 113 (1833), the court observed in defining constructive fraud that: ‘Whenever, however, the 
relations between the contracting parties appear to be of such a character as to render it certain that they 
do not deal on terms of equality but that either on the one side from superior knowledge of the matter 
derived from a fiduciary relation, or from overmastering influence, or on the other from weakness, 
dependence, or trust justifiably reposed, unfair advantage in a transaction is rendered probable, there the 
burden is shifted, the transaction is presumed void, and it is incumbent upon the stronger party to show 
affirmatively that no deception was practiced, no undue influence was used, and that all was fair, open, 
voluntary and well understood.’ 
250 See n 203 above. 
251 Quoting directly from Gardner v Butler, n 150 above. 
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The Supreme Court of Delaware's judgment in Cahall252 focuses on the 
effects of director participation in approving the self-dealing contract and affirms 
the invalidity of the self-dealing transactions as constructive fraud. The court does 
not explore the standard applicable to a self-dealing transaction with a non-
participating director. However, once again the focus on participation and the 
language, if not the precise use, of constructive fraud suggests that the influence 
fiduciary fairness standard would be applicable to such transactions. Unlike the 
Chancery Court the Supreme Court does not explore Gardner remedial fairness. 
Nor does the court refer to authority on self-dealing law apart from Du Pont v Du 
Pont, although it does affirm that the authorities considered by the Chancery Court 
were the leading authorities.   
Cahall brings together remedial fairness and the fiduciary influence standard. 
It arguably applies a fairness standard whether or not the directors participated in 
approving the transaction: if the director did not participate then it suggests that 
the fiduciary influence fairness standard applies; where the director participates 
remedial fairness applies. Thirty years later in Gottlieb v Heyden Chemical Corp,253 the 
court, citing only the Supreme Court’s judgment in Cahall,254 sets forth the general 
proposition that, where the majority of directors are interested, ‘the burden is 
upon the directors to prove not only that the transaction was in good faith, but 
also that its intrinsic fairness will withstand the most searching and objective 
analysis’.  
Delaware itself makes no substantive legal contribution to the development 
of fairness review. This work was done in New Jersey and New York in the mid to 
late-19th century. From an analysis of the limited amount of Delaware self-dealing 
case law we see that Delaware self-dealing law in the early 20th century was in 
effect a blank sheet of paper, and Delaware judges got to choose from the 
approaches and precedent of leading jurisdictions. Perhaps this vantage point 
enabled Delaware to cut through the complexity to see that a remedial fairness 
standard renders other approaches – a strict voidability rule or a participation-
based fiduciary fairness standard – functionally irrelevant. But Delaware courts did 
not alter the nature of the legal standard, whose pro-managerial bias was encoded 
long before Delaware gained corporate legal significance. Of course, this tells us 
nothing about the application of the standard, or the procedural rules that 
structure its application. There is much room to manoeuvre within ‘fairness’. And 
much room to attract managers with a signalled favourable approach to 





                                                     
252 Lofland v Cahall 13 Del.Ch. 384 (1922).  
253 33 Del.Ch.82. 
254 Lofland v Cahall, n 252 above, as the only case cited; the court also cited William Fletcher, Cyclopedia of 
the Law of Private Corporations, Vol 3 (US: Callaghan, 1917), s 921.  





If we posit two approaches to self-dealing law – a strict voidability approach that 
enables the company to invalidate any self-dealing transaction and an approach 
based upon fairness as measured by a market benchmark – and asked managers to 
select their preferred form of regulation, it is highly probable that managers would 
prefer the latter. Benign managers would welcome the flexibility inherent in a 
fairness standard; the less benign would welcome the greater scope to enter into 
self-serving, self-dealing arrangements. According to Harold Marsh’s account of 
the evolution of self-dealing law, the US originally adopted a strict approach which 
rejected fairness but moved over time to a fairness-based approach. According to 
March, this transition was unexplained by the courts in legal or policy terms.  
Juxtaposing the contemporary fairness standard next to the historical strict 
standard Marsh allows us to draw a conclusion and begs a key question. The 
conclusion is that contemporary US corporate law is management friendly and 
more managerial friendly than it used to be. The question is why it has become so 
receptive to managerial interests. There are two components of the answer that a 
contemporary corporate lawyer is likely to give to this question. First, a strict rule 
was not suitable for carrying out business activity through the corporate form, and 
therefore it needed to be changed to a more suitable standard. The second 
component of the answer today would be to explain that managerial pressure is 
likely to be more acute in this context than in any other, because, for the self-
serving director, self-dealing matters – it is a significantly redistributive area of the 
law. Furthermore, state law-makers, including judges, are likely to be receptive to 
such pressures as managers make the reincorporation decision. The conclusion, 
the question, and its answer are reinforced when one looks at self-dealing law in 
comparative perspective. The United Kingdom commenced with a strict standard, 
maintained its strict standard, and has not been exposed to the distortive incentive 
effects of charter competition.    
But if, as is argued in this article, self-dealing law in the US and the UK 
resulted from the adaption of existing fiduciary law to the conception of the 
corporation in the mid to late-19th century then: there is no unexplained shift 
from strict rule to management friendly standard to explain;  no need to rely upon 
non-legal pressures and incentives to explain legal change that the courts failed to 
account for; and the UK’s maintenance of the strict standard has nothing to do 
with allegedly weaker receptivity to management’s interests. That is of course not 
to say that the external context of business activity was not important to the 
translation of existing fiduciary law to the business context. Clearly in both the 
United States and United Kingdom courts were cognisant of the different role of 
self-dealing transaction in the corporate form as compared to the trust context. 
But law is responsive to these pressures in internally consistent ways – generating 
responsive solutions that are legally coherent and consistent. The common law 
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does not, as Marsh’s narrative implies, sacrifice its internal rules and policy 
commitments to satisfy external business demands.  
If there was no shift from strict to flexible standards, then in the context of 
self-dealing law charter competition has limited explanatory power. Although it is 
theoretically compelling that in significantly redistributive areas of corporate law 
state lawmakers are likely to be very receptive to considerable managerial pressure, 
if, as we saw in New Jersey and New York, fairness coexisted at all times with the 
strict standard, then there is no shift to a more managerial friendly position for 
this theory of legal change to explain. Of course, such pressures may manifest 
themselves at the margin, for example in the application of the standard or in the 
form taken by the procedural rules which determine the application of the fairness 
standard, such as evidentiary standards and burdens of proof. But the fairness 
standard itself, as standard bearer of the management friendly bias of US 
corporate law, is not explained by these pressures. Rather it is explained by the 
core components of the conception of the US corporation: its emphasis on the 
public creation of the corporation; its concomitant restraint on contractibility; and 
the state’s direct empowerment of the board of directors.  
Legal realism taught us that hiding in the mouth of the legal dragon255 are 
economic and social policy choices. What it did not teach us is that law is a space 
where only policy debate takes place and where common law legal outcomes are 
only policy choices dressed up to create the effect of legal necessity or inevitability. 
Delaware's corporate legal style, born of its remarkable success in the race for 
corporate charters, even in the absence of an independent corporate legal engine 
that one would have assumed originally propelled such success, plays to this 
misreading of legal realism. It creates the impression that Delaware's legal rules 
have only a perfunctory connection to legal tradition, whereas in fact, at least in 
the self-dealing context, they are rooted in, a largely unattributed, legal tradition. 
The dominant narrative of self-dealing law also plays to this misreading of legal 
realism. Law apparently ignored legal constraint to make a different, although 
unspoken, policy election. In demonstrating that this dominant account of the 
evolution of self-dealing law is wrong, we see that we need to open the mouth of 
our contemporary corporate dragon and search for systemic legal constraint, and 
we see that for contemporary corporate law a significant dose of inevitability was 
administered at the inception of general incorporation. 
                                                     
255 Holmes, n 3 above, noting, ‘When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the 
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.’ 
